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TO ATTAIN "THE JUST REWARDS OF SO
MUCH STRUGGLE": LOCAL-RESIDENT EQUITY
PARTICIPATION IN URBAN REVITALIZATION
BarbaraL. Bezdek*
[L]andlords... grow richer.., in their sleep, without working,
risking, or economizing. What claim have they, on the general
principle of socialjustice, to this accession of riches? In what would
they have been wronged if society had, from the beginning, reserved
the right of taxing the spontaneous increase of rent, to the highest
amount requiredby financialexigencies?'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Annually, Americans pour out their sympathy for people displaced
from their communities by natural disasters such as fires, floods, and
hurricanes. We respond, knowing the anchor that the concept of "home"
supplies to body, soul, and family; to a person's ability to show up for
work and perform in school, to meet friends, to worship with one's
congregation, and otherwise to pursue life, liberty, and happiness. Our
empathy and our tax dollars offer balm even where people put
themselves predictably in harm's way, and fail to prepare for the
inevitable by buying insurance or making more careful decisions. We
intuit the toll exacted by the loss of familiar walls, private homes, and
community-shared places.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I sincerely thank my
dean, Karen Rothenberg, for generous research support; my colleagues Richard Boldt, Jana Singer,
David Super, and the street-smart practitioner-academics of the Mid-Atlantic regional workshop on
theory and practice, for their encouragement and insightful comments in reviewing drafts of this
Article; and Rebecca Shore-Suslowitz, Susan McCarty, and Vaughn Comeau for their research
assistance. Last but not least, I thank the community residents of neighborhoods in East and West
Baltimore who have shared with me their struggles and dreams.
1. JOHN STUART MILL, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 941 (Batoche Books 2001)

(1848).
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Redevelopment policy and practice in the U.S. has relied upon the
massive relocation of poor people and the destruction of poor people's
neighborhoods with only token recognition of the costs and burdens
imposed on the displaced. Although the devastation of community,
family, and lives is just as complete when the disaster is the governmentsanctioned wrecking ball, comparable sympathy is not commonplace for
urban redevelopment refugees. 2 This apathy contrasts sharply with the
outrage that followed the Supreme Court's Kelo v. City of New London 3
decision, where middle-income people were forced from their homes
because local officials believed the city needed the site to attract new
employers.4
The displacement of low-income communities accomplished by
urban redevelopment law and practice in the U.S. continues the
inequities of urban renewal and targets "low-mobility populations"those mostly poor and minority city residents who toil in the background
in the office towers and tourist spots. Their material reality profoundly
diverges from the imagination of policy makers and planners, as was
unmasked by Hurricane Katrina's excruciating devastation of New
Orleans in September 2005. The victims least able to escape the
oncoming storm and last to be remembered in emergency planning and
evacuation were predominantly poor, black, elderly, and disabled.5 As in

2. Some experts estimate average annual expenditures for disaster preparedness and relief at
$7 billion. See, e.g., Raymond Burby et al., Unleashing the Power ofPlanning to Create DisasterResistant Communities, 65 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 247, 248 (1999) (citing DAVID R. CONRAD ET AL.,
HIGHER GROUND: A REPORT ON VOLUNTARY PROPERTY BUYOUTS IN THE NATION'S
FLOODPLAINS: A COMMON GROUND SOLUTION SERVING PEOPLE AT RISK, TAXPAYERS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1998)).
3. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
4. Id. For a taste of the forceful public reactions, see Timothy Egan, Ruling Sets Off Tug of
War Over PrivateProperty, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at Al; Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Folly,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2005, at A14 (describing the Kelo ruling as "shameful" and "scandalous and
cruel"); Virginia Groark, Connecticut Case Lit Fires of Rage, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2005, at 12;
Hands Off Our Homes, ECONOMIST, Aug. 20-26, 2005, at 21, 21-22 [hereinafter Hands Off Our
Homes]; Donald Lambro, Home, Seized Home, WASH. TIMES, July 18, 2005, at A16 (reporting a
nation-wide legislative backlash). Additionally, the "Castle Coalition" website of the Institute for
Justice became a clearinghouse for information about legislative efforts to limit eminent domain.
See Castle Coalition, Citizens Fighting Eminent Domain Abuse, http://www.castlecoalition.org (last
visited Oct. 19, 2006).
5. See David Gonzalez, From Margins of Society to Center of the Tragedy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2005, at Al; Scott Shane & Eric Lipton, Government Saw Flood Risk But Not Levee
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at Al (reporting one consultant's view that the state's
evacuation planning paid little attention to "moving out New Orleans's 'low mobility' populationthe elderly, the infirm and the poor without cars or other means of fleeing the city, about 100,000
people").
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many U.S. cities, New Orleans's poorest residents had nowhere to go
and no way to get outside their familiar districts.
The clamor of displaced residents for government participation in
rebuilding their communities coalesced into a bipartisan proposal for
federal, state and local aid that would have combined governmental
powers of condemnation and eminent domain payments, cleared the land
6
and permitted reconstruction by private developers. Although the
locally generated proposal was embraced enthusiastically by local and
delegation, it
state government officials and the Louisiana congressional
7
officials.
federal
of
foundered on the ambivalence
The federal government's ineffective response to Katrina
communities is at odds with the vigorous role of government in urban
redevelopment. Around the United States, cities are being remade
through increasingly intricate and opaque "public/private partnerships"
("PPPs"), by which local government agencies trade essential
infrastructure at low or no cost in exchange for a profit-sharing stake or
8
other return on the city's investment. While this idea is not new, the
scale of today's municipal reliance upon PPPs blurs the traditional
separateness of the public and private sectors. Urban land is being
reclaimed from low-wealth residents by local governments smitten with
the entrepreneurial spirit. Augmenting their traditional land use powers
with new means of collaboration and exchange with private developers,
local governments seek to reap the benefits of increased investment,
ownership and profit in land deals with those private developers. Local
officials feel the heat of global competition for corporate location and
are mindful that judging cities by their appearance and social climate has
become a major assessment tool for the economic development
which
professions. 9 They engage in energetic "image management" in 10
features."
"presentation
and
assets
are
buildings
and
the city's land

6. See Louisiana Recovery Corporation Act, H.R. 4100, 109th Cong. (lstSess. 2005).
7. Congressman Baker's bill, H.R. 4100, introduced in October 2005, proposed the
formation of a public and private corporation that would buy destroyed homes for the owners'
Blow';
equity. It was rejected by the White House. See Bill Walsh, Baker: Bush Offers Us 'Death
He'll Keep PushingOwn Bill to Rescue State, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 28, 2006, at 1.
8. City officials became dealmakers during the 1970s in order to complete projects begun
the
under federal urban policies, and used their funds to adapt the lessons learned following
BLAKELY,
J.
EDWARD
peak.
distress's
fiscal
1980s-urban
the
in
funds
withdrawal of federal
PLANNING LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 153-54 (2d ed. 1994).
9. Fortune, Money, Financial World, and other leading business periodicals issue annual
the
assessments of cities' performance on this basis, as well as on their capacity to do business with
private sector.
10. BLAKELY, supra note 8, at 155.
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This transformation of U.S. urban landscapes is proceeding at so
great a pace and scale as to support the argument that government
redevelopment is degenerating into an unconstitutional sale of the police
power."l The contest for control of urban land and its occupants' futures
illuminates the struggle in American law and politics to balance societal
interests in the development or preservation of scarce resources, with the
rights of individual property owners and of low-income residents whose
legitimate interests in their homes are not viewed, legally or customarily,
as "entitled."
Today's public/private cooperation has its origins in the first federal
revitalization programs. Congress designed its redevelopment programs
to be federally funded and driven, but implemented at the local level.' 2
Passage of the Housing Act of 194913 was secured by an amalgamation
of disparate interests who saw what they wanted to see in the program. 14
More specifically, "[h]ousing advocates thought it would result in
additional affordable housing, while developers saw it as an economic
opportunity."' 15 Local jurisdictions realized it would give them the tools
to clear away blighted eyesores and to build preferred developments in
16
their place with the Federal Treasury footing the bill.
Over the years, much redevelopment has been sharply criticized for
its displacement of the poor people who lived where local officials
yearned to rebuild. The irony is that the plain purpose of the first
national Housing Act was displacement of the poor. 17 The Act required
that redevelopment occur in a "'slum area or a deteriorated or
deteriorating area which is predominantly residential in character,"' but
did not require that any demolished housing be replaced.'
11. The relationships between local governments and development partners can become so
close that at times it is the private developer, not the government, who initiates the redevelopment
project and dictates the deal. See, e.g., City of Norwood v. Homey, 830 N.E.2d 381, 383-85 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2005); Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or "Hortatory
Fluff'?, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 335, 336 (2006) (arguing that cities which stand to gain financially from
joint development deals have an inherent conflict of interest in the exercise of the police power for
the general welfare).
12. Scott L. Cummings, Recentralization: Community Economic Development and the Case
for Regionalism, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 138-39 (2004).
13. Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (omitted by Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (current version as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000))).
14. Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with
Resident Control,27 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 689, 700 (1994).
15. Id.
16. Id.

17. Id. at 701 n.26, 734.
18. Id.at 700-01 (quoting Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 413).
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Rather than reject outright the profiteering aspects and market
dynamics of city life cycles-which no amount of enlightened public
policy is likely to eliminate-this Article seeks an alternative mode of
responsive policy. I propose to recognize the meaningful claims of
residents displaced by changes in urban land use patterns, through the
allocation of equity stakes in the wealth generated by such citysupported urban redevelopment.
Public/private redevelopment of urban community space must be
controlled by, and directly benefit, the affected city residents so that the
displaced population receives meaningful equity shares in the value
added redevelopment. This approach would update resident participation
strategies in urban land use planning and regulation, extant now for
nearly sixty years, 9 by recognizing with market value the legitimate
interests of residents in the space they co-inhabit. This view is justified
on three grounds: (1) the legal framework offered by property law
recognizes numerous rights of persons residing in the path of
2°
municipality-assisted redevelopment, which currently are destroyed,
without acknowledgement or compensation, in the exercise of urban
redevelopment powers; (2) important community interests of persons
and communities are similarly destroyed-although they have yet to be
recognized as interests in property, they can and should be; and (3)
equitable arguments of varying political stripes support claims for both
recognition of property rights and development of appropriate remedies
for the harms redevelopers inflict on present residents. Existing law has
partially recognized aspects of these ideas and produced remedies for
prospective displacees in the path of urban redevelopment, chiefly in the
21
form of public participation rights in the decision-making process.
While such efforts to marshal the missing voices are appealing and
expand the deliberation about these issues, the remedies are
fundamentally flawed.
In this Article, I will first examine the legal rules that frame
public/private redevelopment in America's cities. Part II reviews the
current system of redevelopment laws and practice, which serve a
narrowly described class of propertied citizens generously while
19. See generally Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted
868-91
Terrain of Community Participationin Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV 861,

(2001) [hereinafter McFarlane, Inclusion] (reviewing various government programs for urban
redevelopment and some of the resulting case law from 1949 to present).
20.
21.

See discussion infra Part III.C.
See, e.g., Quinones, supra note 14, at 753-58, 767 (discussing the Dudley Street

Neighborhood Initiative in Boston and mentioning other examples of resident-controlled
redevelopment).
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simultaneously sinking public subsidy into redevelopment. On the other
side of the equation, however, the same system of laws in effect
specially taxes urban community residents in the path of development by
sweeping aside their tangible and intangible capital and connections,
with the result that neighborhoods of low-income households are
displaced and destroyed, rather than relocated and compensated. This is
accomplished through the active participation of local governments
participating in the urban real estate market, through PPPs rather than
the exercise of constitutional police powers, with the purpose of
engineering new urban territories and repopulating them with the
wealthier classes. Although this social engineering is sometimes
characterized, or justified, as a modem version of the pioneering that
peopled the American plains with striving Europeans,22 the public policy
to so restructure the territories of the central city wrongly allocates the
costs of revitalization to the current residents, and distributes the benefits
to others. This is the antithesis of governance for the general welfare.
Part III briefly reviews familiar arguments to account for the classand race-based inequities in the law and practice of redevelopment, and
finds wanting their associated attempts to resolve the equity dilemmas
through participatory processes, including the weak consultative forms
required by contemporary federal community development laws and
more robust forms being piloted in some locales, as well as distributional
arguments. I argue instead for the opportunities presented by property
law and theory for more analytically and pragmatically satisfactory
solutions. After examining the utility and centrality of property rules to
the problem, I explore ways that property rules can recognize and
prevent the extinguishing of urban residents' well-being and
relationships to inhabited locales overrun by redevelopment.23
Ultimately I conclude that these dilemmas can be resolved best through
reconceiving residents' legitimate interests in their community locale as
an asset of value, and justifying their participation as decision-makers
and beneficial owners of the redevelopment projects that displace them.
Part IV proposes the creation of community equity shareholding to
achieve community ownership, participation in decision-making, and

22. See generally William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L.
REV. 553 (1972) (tracing the origins of the doctrine of eminent domain in England and colonial
America).
23. See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-being and the Objectives
of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1669 (2003) (arguing for an objective theory of well-being for
legal theory and developing an objective approach to property law).
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material benefit from public/private urban redevelopment projects that
displace long-term residents.
II.

THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK OF REDEVELOPMENT LAW AND
PRACTICE
A.

Introduction: Why Revitalize Cities?

Just a few short years ago, cities were deemed pass6 as places of
residence because capitalism had demonstrably picked up and moved to
the suburbs. But in the new millennium in the United States, only a few
24
dying midwestern cities are still being "thrown away" wholesale. We
grapple with a new era of red-hot housing markets and hotly-pursued
gentrification. It seems the right is pleased to make money selling highend condos and townhouses, and the left is confused or splintered, with
many hoping to "turn around" under-valued, low-income neighborhoods
in ways almost certain to bring in gentrification and displacement.
Others see urban redevelopment as an antidote to the environmental
damage of suburban sprawl.2 5 The contemporary movement to preserve
central cities is informed by an array of research, rationales, and
instructive observations. One view is that vibrant cities remain key
26
elements of a nation's economic life. Jane Jacobs, for example, argues:
"Societies and civilizations in which the cities stagnate don't develop
27
and flourish further. They deteriorate., Other commentators view cities
as important sites for the practice of participatory democracy by people
28
of diverse races, ethnicity, classes and interests; as central hubs inthe
24. See Donald A. Hicks, Revitalizing Our Cities or Restoring Ties to Them? Redirecting the
in
Debate, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 816 (1994) (chronicling the significant population decline
The
see
But
States).
United
the
of
rest
the
with
compared
Detroit and other midwestern cities as
Brookings Institution, Transcript of the Metropolitan Policy Program Forum, Rebuilding After
for Southern Louisiana (Feb. 21, 2006),
Katrina: Forming the Federal-State-Local Partnership
20 06 22
0 I.pdf (discussing the massive scale of
availableat http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/
Katrina).
Hurricane
after
rebuilding efforts
25. See, e.g., Bruce S. Katcher, Is Brownfields Redevelopment a Partial Response to
Suburban Sprawl in NJ?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 13, 2000, available at
http://www.mgkflaw.com/articles/isbrownfieldsredevelopmentapartialresponsetosuburbansprawlinn
j.html.
26. JANE JACOBS, CITIES AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 109
(1984).
27. Id. at 232.
28. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part lI-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 346, 396 (1990); Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Futureof Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
953, 968 (1967); Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial Response to Richard
Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1996).
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economic and social well-being of metropolitan areas; 29 and as the space
and context that provide us the opportunity for "surprise, tolerance,
innovation, and participation." 30 Still others argue for the preservation of
cities in order to stanch the social inequalities that attend suburban
sprawl, 3 1 and to redress the mounting inequalities of opportunity of the
nation's poor, 32 most of whom live in central cities.
B. Neighborhoods in the Path of Urban Redevelopment
It is a familiar practice that development decisions impose burdens
on persons who are excluded from the established decision-making
process. In contemporary redevelopment, cities increasingly identify
areas where they would like to support redevelopment in various ways.
Cities may do so under formal urban renewal statutes, which make
condemnation and government subsidies available after designation of
an area as afflicted by "blight."33 States' definitions of blight vary
tremendously in scope and address intervention by state and local
governments in the market for land titles and underutilization,34 as well
as powers to direct and manage growth within their borders.35
29. ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 52-55 (1994); MYRON
ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 28, 130-31 (2002); see also
DAVID RUSK, BALTIMORE UNBOUND: CREATING A GREATER BALTIMORE REGION FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, at xxiii-xxvi (1996).
30. LARRY BENNETT, FRAGMENTS OF CITIES: THE NEW AMERICAN DOWNTOWNS AND
NEIGHBORHOODS 13 (1990).
31. See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 312-15 (2004); see also Sheryll D. Cashin, Essay, Drifting

Apart.: How Wealth and Race Segregation Are Reshaping the American Dream, 47 VILL. L. REV.
595, 598, 600, 601 (2002); Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis:Symptoms, Causes, and Solutions,
in RACE, POVERTY, AND AMERICAN CITIES 102, 105 (John Charles Boger & Judith Welch Wegner
eds., 1996); Daniel J. Hutch, The Rationalefor Including DisadvantagedCommunities in the Smart
Growth MetropolitanDevelopment Framework,20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 353, 359 (2002).
32. See Inequality in America: The Rich, the Poor and the Growing Gap Between Them,
ECONOMIST, June 17-23, 2006, at 28, 28.
33. The most compelling study of the rhetorical power of "blight" as a legal concept and of
the property-rights-limitation it effected in Public Use Clause jurisprudence is Wendell E. Pritchett,
The "PublicMenace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 1-3 (2003) (showing how renewal advocates created a discourse of blight as
disease that endangers the future of the city to secure public and judicial support for the expansive
use of eminent domain that resulted in federal and state urban renewal programs).
34. For example, New Jersey allows condemnation where an area suffers from:
[a] growing lack or total lack of proper utilization of areas caused by the condition of the
title, diverse ownership of the real property therein or other conditions, resulting in a
stagnant or not fully productive condition of land potentially useful and valuable for
contributing to and serving the public health, safety and welfare.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-5e (West Supp. 2006). Similarly broad powers are found in the
redevelopment statutes of many states, including California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Maine,
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Entrepreneurial cities increasingly engage in land banking or oldfashioned land assembly, then issue requests for development proposals
("RFPs") or requests for qualifications ("RFQs") for the development of
desired uses on specific sites. 36 Each of these processes contemplates an
energetic level of communication and decisional participation between
potential parties to the deal, but no more than statutorily required noticeparticipation by the public.37 Residents whose interests will be
profoundly affected by the replacement of nearby row homes with a
stadium or big box store have no more right to notice or participation
than do taxpayers across town. Notice is achieved by formal publication,
email to
or on the redevelopment agency's website and by snail mail and
38
list.
mailing
the
on
placed
be
to
ask
who
business
the
in
those
At another level, the exclusion is achieved by the operative legal
rules framing the interests and relationships recognized in
redevelopment decision-making. These begin with property law. Owners
of real property may sell it without consulting their neighbors due to the
meanings engrafted on fee ownership. While these sales are also subject
to doctrinal and contractual provisions as to others' interests in the
property, such as those of co-owners, mortgagees, lienors, leaseholders
and common interest community residents, property sold to a new owner
may be redesigned, demolished, rebuilt or used in ways that may be
offensive or disturbing to the property's remaining neighbors, provided
the municipality's zoning law is followed (or an exception is obtained)
and the new use is not a legally cognizable public or private nuisance.3 9

Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 33037(b) (West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 4505 (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-613(b)-(c) (2000); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-61-1 (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A,

§ 5104(2)(B) (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 23G, § 16 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 469.028 (West 2001); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-31.1-1
(1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 36-48 (2005 & Supp. 2006).
35. See, e.g., Constr. Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1975);
Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 300-05 (N.Y. 1972).
36. See, e.g., Kanner, supra note 11, at 340.
37. See McFarlane, Inclusion, supranote 19, at 880, 895.
38. See, e.g., Procurement FAQs, Maryland Department of Business and Economic
http://www.choosemaryland.org/AboutDBED/statecontracting/Procurement
Development,
FAQs.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (describing Maryland law's requirement that "all
procurement opportunities with Maryland State agencies that are anticipated to exceed $25,000 in
cost must be advertised" and that "[s]olicitations for contracts valued between $10,000 and $25,000
must either be published in a newspaper or periodical of general circulation, or in an electronic
media generally available to the business community, or posted on an agency bid board").
39. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property:
Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations,30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 312 (2006).
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This pattern among owners and occupants of adjacent parcels is
parallel to the interlocal conflicts between jurisdictions. Local officials
of one jurisdiction may make land use decisions to approve the
development of commercial, residential or mixed uses within its
borders-for example, a stadium or a shopping center-that will impose
traffic and draw revenue away from the residents of the neighboring
localities. The burdened community is not a party to the land-use
decision process. All the benefit will flow to the developers, owners, and
local government of the approving jurisdiction.
Many legal approaches have developed in recent years to address
the problem of development's inequitable allocations of benefits and
burdens in the context of intergovernmental conflict. As between cities
and their wealthier suburbs, fairer allocations of the benefits and burdens
of urban growth are promoted by growth management strategies,
regional cooperation or governance, and various economic incentives.40
C. Land Use Regulation
1. From Comprehensive Planning and Zoning to Negotiated
Deal-making
Local governments derive their power to regulate the use and
development of land from the police power, that extremely broad power
of government to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare
of the people that is reserved to the states in the federal Constitution.4
The original template for modem land use regulation has undergone
tremendous remodeling in the last sixty years. Today, it provides a
highly flexible scaffold for public/private negotiation over profit-driven
real estate development deals, from which the state actor is increasingly
40. MAUREEN KENNEDY & PAUL LEONARD, THE BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URBAN AND
METRO. POLICY, DEALING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: A PRIMER ON GENTRIFICATION AND
POLICY CHOICES 4, 12-14, 18-20, 28-39 (2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
es/urban/gentrification/gentrification.pdf see also Patricia E. Salkin, The Smart Growth Agenda: A
Snapshot of State Activity at the Turn of the Century, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 271, 271 (2002);
see generally David L. Callies, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: A Quarter Century of Progress, 26
URB. LAW. 197 (1994) (discussing the use of growth management plans and local, regional, and
state planning programs).
41. "The police power belongs to state governments, but all states have delegated the power
to impose land use regulations to cities and counties," with the exception of Hawaii. PETER W.
SALSICH, JR. & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS &
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF LAND USE LAW 5 (2d ed. 2003) (citing state statutes). The federal
Constitution limits the exercise of the police power-the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the taking of private property for public use without just compensation, require due process prior to
deprivations of property, and guarantee all persons the equal protections of the laws.
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seeking income and an equity stake, as well as the traditional products of
development. In the 1920s, the Supreme Court's approval of
comprehensive zoning was tied to the notion of comprehensive planning
for types of use that was implemented at the level of each parcel.42 By
the 1950s, the rigidity of this approach was eclipsed in popularity by
regulatory approaches aimed at greater flexibility.43 New forms of
zoning evolved in already-built cities to encompass regulation of parcels
larger than the individual lot; the basic planned unit development
("PUD") concept gave birth to special district zoning, overlay zones,
floating zones, and transfer rights in density and development." At the
same time, subdivision regulations took shape to enable the subdivision
of raw land for development in concert with publicly provided facilities
such as roads, sewers, parks, and schools.4 5
Exactions augmented the land use regulatory tool kit in the boom
and bust decade of the 1980s in the forms of required dedications of
land, or lesser interests in real property, or of required payments of
money, in the form of linkage fees, impact fees, and payments in lieu of
taxes. 46 The utility and purpose of exactions is to spread the public costs
of infrastructure to support a particular new land use onto the developers
47
who would put the land into that new use.
Today, urban land use decision-making is marked by negotiated
public/private deal making.48 This approach has eclipsed both the
original methods of command-and-control regulation and publicregarding linkage ordinances, replacing these with the norms of private
market transactions. 49 These negotiated deals are bilateral talks between

42. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-90 (1926).
43. Brian W. Ohm & Robert J. Sitkowski, The Influence of New Urbanism on Local
Ordinances: The Twilight of Zoning?, 35 URB. LAW. 783,785 (2003).

44. Id.
45. See Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get What You Pay For"
Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 416-17 (2004).
46. See Derek J. Williams, Rethinking Utah's Prohibitionon School Impact Fees, 22 J.LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 489,491 (2002).
47. ALAN A. ALTSHULER ET AL., REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
LAND USE EXACTIONS 3-4 (1993).
48. See ROSS MILLER, HERE'S THE DEAL: THE BUYING AND SELLING OF A GREAT AMERICAN
CITY 207, 243 (1996). Carol M. Rose traces the origins and peculiar outcomes of piecemeal land
controls in Planning & Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71
CAL. L. REV. 837 (1983). See also Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and
Promise of Bargainingin Land Use PlanningConflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 347 (2002).
49. Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for
Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, 24
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 4, 15-16 (2005). Traditionally, zoning codes were intended to embody the
community's vision for the locality, preserved by allowing only limited variances from that vision.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:37

applicants and municipalities who exercise land use authority through a
series of contract-like mechanisms that strive to emulate the efficiencies
and efficacy of private business operations.50 Local governments thus
partner with private developers as co-investors, as much as they exercise
the police power to promote the general welfare.
2.

Municipal Powers Under the Federal Constitution and State
Delegation
Even as the command-and-control regulations evolved, courts
distinguished appropriate contracts between governments and private or
public parties from those that would entail the intolerable sale of police
power. 1 Courts recognized governments' ability to contract for an array
of municipal functions provided they were ministerial, business-related
or technical, such as the purchase, sale, or lease of government property,
maintenance or establishment of public improvements, or hiring legal or
financial counsel.52
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, courts imposed some
limitations on the power to use exaction devices by imposing legal tests.
This static character served the positive purposes of the zoning regime, by discouraging piecemeal
changes and frequent revision, which have tendencies to undermine fairness and foment uncertainty.
While administrative mechanisms for special permits, variances and rezonings were available, they
were only meant to address exceptional, unforeseen, or otherwise essential modifications to the
community's comprehensive plan. Thus, the traditional zoning process relied upon the expertise of
local government's planning department as to appropriate uses and applicable requirements for each
property, including approval of a development application. Developers would apply for particular
development approvals, but rather than bargain, the local government would exercise its police
powers to determine whether the application met the codified zoning requirements, and approve or
deny the application on this basis alone.
50. Id. at 4, 16; see also MILLER, supra note 48, at 149-91.
51. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1140 n.359
(1980).
52. OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 670 n.2 (2d ed.
2001). Certain contracts are ultra vires, exceeding the locality's charter or statutory powers. Id. at
672. Contracts made in violation of public policy may include those made for an unreasonable
length of time, as well as those that promise a particular governmental action or non-exercise of
governmental power. Id. at 673. "Contracts to exercise governmental powers in particular ways are
void as against public policy." Id. at 675. In the 1990s, states' adoption of acts enabling
development agreements were a response to the strict rules propounded by state courts.
Development agreements provide local governments with a revolutionary degree of flexibility. The
agreements are long-term bilateral contracts, whose genius is to provide the applicant-developer
with a vested right to develop a property that, in the absence of the development agreement, might
violate generally applicable zoning regulations. The local government and developer-applicant
negotiate over fees, conditions, regulatory coverage, and the lifetime of the agreement. See David L.
Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and the
Development Agreement Solution: Bargainingfor Public Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 51
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 663, 664-65, 671 (2001); see also Frug, supra note 51, at 1139.
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Local governments had to show, by individualized determination, both
an essential relationship and rough proportionality between the impact
on the public of the proposed land use and the impact of the exaction on
the landowner.5 3 These doctrinal changes scarcely affect the urban land
Tigard,54
use contests discussed here. On the facts of Dolan v. City of
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,55 small towns' efforts to
exact the creation of public greens or beach ways form a distinguishable
56
category of contest from urban displacement near downtown growth.
Traditionally, the public sector performed the functions of
regulation and provision of "public works," such as roadways, water and
sanitation, following the projections of planners for changes in
population and citizen demand. 57 Funding of public works depended on
the jurisdiction's capital budget, met through local revenues and
state/federal intergovernmental transfers.5 8 Although these public
infrastructural investments clearly attract and support new development,
the legal and fiscal arrangements were largely distinct. Private
developers originated projects based on their own market information
and project planning, without the public's involvement.59 Under this
division of effort, local governments deployed public process and public
fisc without undertaking any of the entrepreneurial risks familiar to
private sector developers.
Cutbacks in federal urban aid in the 1980s, however, impelled
many local governments to improvise in order to meet their city
planning and economic development objectives. 60 Tax cutting referenda
put a political damper on raising public revenue through tax rate hikes or
new bond issues. 61 Squeezed by fiscal restraints and rising land prices in
the 1980s, local governments reshaped the traditional development
process by expanding the sphere of public activity to better harness
53. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
54. 512 U.S. at 374.
55. 483 U.S. at 825.
56. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379; Noilan, 483 U.S. at 827.
57.

See Nicole Stelle Gamett, Unsubsidizing Suburbia, 90 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459, 477

(2005) (reviewing RICHARDSON DILWORTH, THE URBAN ORIGINS OF SUBURBAN AUTONOMY
(2005)); see also Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation:
Payingfor Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 179-80 (2006).
58. See Garnett, supra note 57, at 477; Rosenberg, supra note 57, at 187.
59. See generally PAUL C. BROPHY & JENNIFER S. VEY, THE BROOKINGS INST., SEIZING CITY
ASSETS:

TEN

STEPS

TO

URBAN

LAND

REFORM

5-6

(2002),

available

at

http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/brophyveyvacantsteps.pdf.
60. See Garnett, supranote 57, at 477-78; Rosenberg, supra note 57, at 180.
61. See Garnett, supranote 57, at 478.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:37

development as a strategic opportunity.6 2 If effectively deployed, this
resource might recapture hidden land values, finance essential
infrastructure, revitalize downtowns, stimulate economic growth, and
generate jobs.63
The result is a sloppy stew of redevelopment policies administered
by quasi-public agencies, exercising quasi-executive functions, with
opportunities for patronage in the administration of these programs
having significant real estate elements. The sweep of programs by which
government engages in affordable housing, such as business recruitment,
economic development, community revitalization, and development
approvals and expenditures, has grown over the decades and the result is
neither coordinated nor targeted or calibrated to the general welfare.
Judicial deference ratifies the deal makers as the "interested parties" in
analysis of the validity of land use regulation. 64 Kelo's 5-4 decision, as a
matter of the federal Constitution, eliminates the need for even a fig leaf
of blight.65
The cornerstone of the American constitutional framework for the
rights of the governed and the powers of government is the principle that
individuals will not be asked to shoulder more than a reasonable share of
the cost of public goods.66 The bounded character of the doctrinal
categories-here, "land use regulation"--coupled with the frank selfinterest of the private sector and the intensifying entrepreneurship of the
public agencies, operate to shrink consideration of redevelopment
benefits to the economic use that can be made of the land, and the
property rights of the landowner.
D.

Government's Activist Hand in the ResidentialLandscape

1. Legal Policy Interventions in the Residential Market
The operation of market forces is the familiar basis for the
argument that government action is unnecessary to redress the
disproportionate burden on residents in most urban revitalization efforts.
Only where the distribution of burdens and benefits is caused by
identifiably unlawful, discriminatory or biased process should the law
step in to regulate. The unequal allocation of redevelopment burdens on
62. See id. at 482.
63. Brophy & Vey, supra note 59, at 5, 7-8, 18-20.
64. SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 41, at 81-83.
65. Kanner, supra note 11, at 343.
66. EzRA TAFT BENSON, THE PROPER ROLE OF GOvERNMENT (1968),
http://www.laissez-fairerepublic.com/benson.htm.
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poor or minority communities might be lamentable but it is not legally
cognizable since it is pinned not on intentional discrimination by
identifiable actors but to the operation of faceless market forces such as
67
land costs and comparative efficiencies.
The market account masks the hefty hand that government has
played in current land use allocations. The government, in fact, has
played so pervasive a role in the land use regimes that shape
neighborhoods that "it is simply impossible to imagine what
neighborhoods would have looked like in a 'free market' that left
residential choices up to consumers., 68 Government policies profoundly
shape who lives next to whom as a matter of current legal doctrine and
policy, not history alone. 69 The indelible remaking of the landscape is
now widely recognized as rooted in the massively funded federal
policies of the twentieth century: the federal government's unparalleled
investment in interstate highways, the explicit racism of the Federal
Housing Administration's redlining that funded white flight from cities
to suburbs, and the immense (and racially skewed) federal subsidy of
homeownership through the federal mortgage interest deduction.7 °
Certain federal policy choices provided essential preconditions for
the deconstruction of urban centers and subsequent growth of suburban
areas. Foremost was the nation's sustained commitment of public dollars
to build highways. A federal trust fund, established in 1956, poured
revenue into highway construction projects and was "continually
replenished by specially designated tax collections .... ,

In other

industrialized nations, money for roads comes from general revenues72
budgets.
and thus must compete with other priorities in national
67. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NOT IN MY BACKYARD: EXECUTIVE ORDER
12,898 AND TITLE VI AS TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 13, 15-17 (2003),
availableat http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/envjust/ej0104.pdf.
68. Vicki Been, Residential Segregation: Vouchers and Local Government Monopolists, 23
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 33, 35-36 (2005).

69. Id. at 36.
70. For the most influential examination of the root causes of our existing land use patterns,
see KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES

(1985); see also Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: PoliticalGeography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843 (1994); Howard P. Wood, How Government Highway Policy
Encourages Sprawl, CATO INST., Sept. 18, 1998, available at http://www.cato.org/dailys/8-1898.html.
71. PIETRO S. NIVOLA, LAWS OF THE LANDSCAPE: HOW POLICIES SHAPE CITIES IN EUROPE
AND AMERICA 13 (1999); see also Kevin Douglas Kuswa, Suburbification, Segregation, and the
Consolidationof the Highway Machine, 3 J.L. SOC'Y 31,32 (2002).

72. NIVOLA, supra note 71, at 13. The United States was not the only nation to plan a federal
highway system; France did so at about the same time. Nonetheless, the size and scale of the U.S.
undertaking differentiates it from European nations, in that it required transcontinental roads, as
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Subsidies for automobile-accommodating development take several
forms, including direct expenditures for roads,7 3 developer exactions for
roads and parking,7 4 minimal taxation on automobiles and fuel, and
beneficial tax treatment for automobiles]. 5 These subsidies are a "reverse
wealth redistribution," whereby the suburban commuters are subsidized
by the car-less poor, "those relegated to shelter in the poorest census
tracts ....,,76 Roads in the United States continue to consume the

preponderant share of public investment in all modes of transportation.
In 1945, public transit accounted for over thirty percent of all urban
passenger miles traveled, but fifty years later, the figure had dropped to
barely two percent. 7 7 To an appreciable extent, density is determined by
transit policy. Reducing urban density removes the critical mass of
clustered population and workplaces that would support greater public
transit investments while reinforcing the use of private automobiles. Fuel
pricing policies are just one of the energy policies that encourage sprawl,
auto-centric travel, and demand for spacious housing.78 These
complement the post-war housing policies most associated with white

well as inter-city and intra-metropolitan connectors. In the 1950s, the Cold War was not merely
pretext for the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. However, federal direction of
road-building resources began still earlier, in the 1930s, when federal grants for state highway
building were conditioned on state governments limiting their own toll-road collections to road
improvement. Id. at 13-14.
73. Eric A. Cesnik, The American Street, 33 URB. LAW. 147, 174-76 (2001) (2000 R. Marlin
Smith Student Writing Competition Award Winner) (noting that federal funding for roads was
expected to be $40.4 billion in 2001, compared with just $5 billion for all other public transit).
74. Communities vary widely as to whether the full cost of the automobile infrastructure is
shifted or the developer (or its consumers) receives hidden subsidies. Where communities require
developers to pay less than their fair share of infrastructure development, the cost is covered from
the general revenues, including the car-less taxpayers. JAMES A. KUSHNER, THE POST-AUTOMOBILE
CITY: LEGAL MECHANISMS TO ESTABLISH THE PEDESTRIAN-FRIENDLY CITY 15-17 (2004).
75. Those who use their vehicles for business are permitted to write-off vehicle expenses from
ordinary income. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000). Suburban automobile users pay up to twenty-five percent
of the true cost of their transportation, compared to transit users who pay eighty percent of the true
costs. KUSHNER, supra note 74, at 22-23 n.82 (citing KATIE ALVORD, DIVORCE YOUR CAR!:
ENDING THE LOVE AFFAIR WITH THE AUTOMOBILE 104 (2000)).

76. KUSHNER, supra note 74, at 16-17; John Pucher & John L. Renne, Socioeconomics of
Urban Travel: Evidence from the 2001 NHTS, 57 TRANSP. Q. 49, 56 (2003). While 0.9% of
households with incomes between $75,000 and $99,999 had no car, the proportion swells as
incomes decrease. Of households with incomes between $20,000 and $39,999, 5% were without a
car, and 26.5% of households with incomes less than $20,000 had no car. Id.
77. See Urban Transport Fact Book, U.S. Urban Personal Vehicle & Public Transport Market
Share from 1945, http://www.publicpurpose.com/ut-usptshare45.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2007)
(citing data from JAMES DUNN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS: DRIVING FORCES

(2000)); see also PIETRO S. NIVOLA & ROBERT W. CRANDALL, THE EXTRA MILE: RETHINKING
ENERGY POLICY FOR AUTOMOTIVE TRANSPORTATION 62 (1995).

78. NIVOLA, supra note 71, at 16-19.
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flight and the rise of suburban sprawl.7 9 The federal mortgage guarantees
subsidized new housing and incorporated two far-reaching program
preferences, the first for new construction over rehabilitation, and the
second, for racial exclusion. 80 One little-cited consequence is the
allocation of new housing types. While the federal government
subsidized new single-family housing for white suburbs, it built blocks
of public housing for the cities. 8 1 As a result, today's urban
concentrations are some of the lowest-quality low-income housing,
forming a disproportionate share of the affordable housing offered to
low-income minority households. This contrasts starkly with Europe,
where two-thirds of all housing is publicly funded.8 2
Tax policies and the methods of collecting public tax dollars
continue to promote city residents' relocation to suburbs and have
significant implications for urban land use. The homeowner's mortgage
deduction is the best known and is just one of several features in the U.S.
tax system that favors the growth of suburbs.8 3 Local governments
collect three-quarters or more of their revenues from taxes on property. 84
This gives each local jurisdiction a strong incentive to maximize the
assessed value of its real estate and to attain the wherewithal to cover the
expense of local services. Localities compete for business location,
investment and retention, and for more well-heeled residents. 85
79. See Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl. Not Just an Environmental Issue, 84 MARQ. L.
REV. 301, 304-12 (2000) (discussing the white flight and the rise of the suburban sprawl).
80. See William E. Nelson & Norman R. Williams, Suburbanization and Market Failure: An
Analysis of Government Policies Promoting Suburban Growth and Ethnic Assimilation, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 197,226-35 (1999).
81. See Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural Modernism,
Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699,765-73 (1993).
82. These comparisons to European policies shaping urban space are not intended to suggest
that U.S. policy can or should be changed to Europeanize U.S. cities. Nivola argues that this would
not be even faintly possible, since he attributes the more efficient and contained style of urban land
use to conjoined policies of steep consumption taxes, broad rental housing subsidies, and localbusiness protectionism in Europe and Japan. NIVOLA, supra note 7 1, at 12-52.
83. Id. at 24-26.
84. Id. at 26 (observing that of the G-7 nations, "only Canada relies as much on the taxation
of income [as the United States]" and only Japan compares to the United States in use of property
taxes). Id. at 25. In other wealthy nations such as Germany, Japan, Italy and France, the percentages
range from nineteen percent to forty-three percent. Id. at 26 (citing Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Revenue Statistics 1965-1996 (1997)).
85. Affluent communities intentionally, and rationally, engage in "fiscal zoning" to secure for
themselves the highest tax base for the lowest services burden. The practices, and their wealthconcentrating effects, are delineated in Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny
of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2012-15
(2000). Competition for wealthier residents underlies a wide variety of exclusionary zoning
practices, such as mandatory minimum lot size, prohibition of multi-family housing, and exclusion
of mobile homes. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
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Related policies of intergovernmental revenue sharing also
perpetuate the divide. United States localities must raise and fund twothirds of their own expenditures, 86 which fuels the inter-jurisdiction
competition to bolster the local economic base. The relative poverty of
cities is exacerbated by the volume of unfunded federal mandates. These
mandates further advantage prosperous suburbs and disadvantage
fiscally weak municipalities who must then seek to raise property
taxes.8 7
State and local government policy likewise shapes the current
88
In
structure of our patterns of housing location and segregation.
conjunction with federal policies, cities and suburbs used their police
the proximity of users,
powers to direct land uses, and more particularly
89
through tenement codes and municipal zoning.

Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 39-58 (1990); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth
Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977); Peter W. Salsich, Jr.,
Displacement and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel Perspective, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 333
(1984); J. Peter Byrne, Are Suburbs Unconstitutional?,85 GEO. L.J. 2265 (1997) (reviewing DAVID
L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995)). Legal scholars
have paid considerably less attention to interlocal competition for business investment. See Richard
Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governance, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 365 (1999); Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalism and InterlocalBargains, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 190 (2001) (discussing the extant literature of interlocal economic competition).
86. NIVOLA,supra note 71, at 26.
87. Id. at 34. The United States is the only developed nation not to have a land bank, although
a number of U.S. cities and states are beginning to establish their own. See BLAKELY, supra note 8,
at 155-57. The U.S. form of zoning, which separates residential and commercial uses, is linked by
some to the demise of small shops in urban neighborhoods; unlike European cities, most U.S. cities
have no "High Street" where parking is disallowed to make pedestrian-friendly shopping spaces.
NIVOLA, supra note 71, at 31-32; see also KUSHNER, supra note 74, at 48. Nor does the United
States have laws similar to those in Europe and Japan that protect local distribution systemsincluding family-owned businesses-from inroads of mega-chains. NIVOLA, supra note 71, at 32.
88. "Prior to the turn of the twentieth century, worker housing was located near employer
housing," and race was not the dominant residential divider that it is in the United States. Been,
supra note 68, at 36. In fact, "[s]ome of the current separation of classes and races can be attributed
to [the century's] changes in transportation." Id. For example, maids, gardeners, and nannies
commonly commute to work rather than live in or near their wealthy employers' houses. Id. See
generally DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME, OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN

AMERICA (1999); James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America: An Historicaland Legal Analysis of
Contemporary Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 How. L.J. 547, 566-609
(1979).
89. See Frank S. Alexander, The Housing of America's Families: Control, Exclusion, and
Privilege, 54 EMORY L.J. 1231, 1257 (2005); Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal,
Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 308-09
(2004); KUSHNER, supra note 74, at 568-69, 571; Garrett Power, Meade v. Dennistone: The
NAACP's Test Case to ".... Sue Jim Crow out of Maryland with the Fourteenth Amendment", 63
MD. L. REV. 773, 789 (2004); see generally Davison M. Douglas, The Quest for Freedom in the
Post-Brown South: Desegregationand White Self-interest, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689 (1994).
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Today, the law does not allow one to house her own grandmother, or
nanny, in a granny flat. If one wants to live in a mixed use
neighborhood, most jurisdictions simply do not provide them. If one
wants to live in the center city, the tax ramifications of doing so make
that "choice" unavailable for all but the wealthiest of families. Indeed,
if one wants to live in any place other than the suburbs, the economics
of doing so are daunting, not because of the market, but because of the
myriad ways in which federal
and state governments subsidize the cost
90
of living in the suburbs.
In other words, law constrains those choices in so many ways that the
notion of "choice" is fantasy.
2. Opening the New Urban Territories: Public/Private Partnerships
Serving Some of the Public
Government policy stacks the deck against low-wealth urban
communities through the structures it requires for community
involvement in development decision-making. These structures are
inaccessible to residents of most communities that bear the brunt of
redevelopment today. Much contemporary redevelopment policy
implemented by U.S. cities focuses narrowly on restoring vibrancy and
solvency to central cities through policies that inflict further harms on
existing poor and working-poor residents. 91 The residential strategy
features attracting middle and upper middle class residents back to city
centers through a mix of housing types and amenities that appeal to
young professionals and empty-nesters.9 2 Cities also pursue business
development strategies and engage in vigorous inter-jurisdictional

90. Been, supra note 68, at 36; see generally Scott W. Allard & Sheldon Danziger, Proximity
& Opportunity: How Residence and Race Affect the Employment of Welfare Recipients, 13
HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 675
(2003), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.

org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_ 1304_allard.pdf (discussing the relationship between welfare recipients
and their physical proximity and access to available jobs).
91. See Quinones, supranote 14, at 741.
92. See id. at 695-96 (arguing that this is transparently a class-based strategy, seeking to cater
to the entertainment tastes of largely white middle class residents); see generally BERNARD J.
FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: How AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES (1989); JOHN
KROMER, NEIGHBORHOOD RECOVERY: REINVESTMENT POLICY FOR THE NEW HOMETOWN (2000)

(examining strategies used in Philadelphia); Chris Tilly et al., Space as a Signal: How Employers
Perceive Neighborhoods in Four Metropolitan Labor Markets, in URBAN INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE

FROM FOUR CITIES 304 (Alice O'Connor et al. eds., 2001) (examining the insulation of racially
segregated neighborhoods from the hubs of job-growth used in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit and Los
Angeles).
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offering employment or other
competition to create business locations
93
boosts to the municipality's economy.
As project complexity has increased, participation policies have not
kept pace. Community development projects9 4 are produced by a
complex network-government policymakers, personnel in multiple
departments, agencies, programs at federal, state and local levels, staff
and directors of nonprofit organizations' foundations and their program
managers, and an extensive array of for-profit and not-for-profit
development partners-as well as lawyers, planners, architects and
builders. These players then typically relate to each other as participants
in (1) direct physical development of housing or of facilities to be leased
to existing for-profit businesses or to start-up local businesses, (2)

93. See Joshua P. Rubin, Note, Take the Money and Stay: Industrial Location Incentives and
Relational Contracting, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1277, 1299-1314 (1995) (discussing the impact of plant
closings on local communities and the scale of the problem for localities); see also Christian
Parenti, Making Prison Pay: Business Finds the Cheapest Labor of All, NATION, Jan. 29, 1996, at
11, 12 (discussing the profits being made by states from prison labor).
Increasingly, studies show that downtown development subsidies have "failed to benefit
the neighborhoods that are home to the poorest residents of the cities." Audrey G. McFarlane, Race,
Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 331-32,
333 (1999) [hereinafter McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place] (observing that these strategies of
"economic development promote[] capital accumulation and mobility that intentionally bypass[]
poor neighborhoods"). See also GREG LEROY & TYSON SLOCUM, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
MINNESOTA: HIGH SUBSIDIES, LOW WAGES, ABSENT STANDARDS 1 (1999) (finding that, despite

very high public subsidies to support economic development in Minnesota, the subsidized
corporations had created jobs with "surprisingly low" wages); Scott L. Cummings, Community
Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grass-roots Movement for Economic
Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 449 nn.261 & 262 (2001) (noting that "although the Los Angeles
Community Development Bank made $97 million in loans to businesses within the Empowerment
Zone (EZ), only 249 jobs were retained or created for EZ residents" (citing CTR. FOR CMTY.
CHANGE, BRIGHT PROMISES; QUESTIONABLE RESULTS: AN EXAMINATION OF How WELL THREE
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY PROGRAMS CREATED JOBS 9-11 (1990) (analyzing the limited return on

public subsidies to businesses, in the forms of enterprise zones, industrial revenue bonds, and Urban
Development Action Grants) and James Sterngold, A Grand Idea That Went Awry: Big
Redevelopment Effort Falls Short in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999, at BUI)); Downtown
Redevelopment as an Urban Growth Strategy: A CriticalAppraisalof the Baltimore Renaissance,9
J. URB. AFF. 103, 115 (1987).
94. See generally William H. Simon, The Community Economic Development Movement,
2002 WIS. L. REV. 377. Federal programs typically define the activities that can be funded, and the
entities that can receive funding, for program purposes. For example, the rules implementing the
Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") define community development to include the following
types of activities that promote community welfare: "(1) affordable housing ... for low or moderate
income individuals; (2) community services targeted to low or moderate income individuals;
(3) [certain] activities that promote economic development... ; and (4) activities that revitalize or
stabilize low or moderate income geographies." Bennet S. Kom et al., The New Regulations
Implementing the Community Reinvestment Act, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 29,30 (1995).
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technical and grant assistance or loans in connection with development
95
projects, or (3) direct investments as partners in a joint venture.
While a number of Community Development Corporations
("CDCs") formed initially for the purpose of re-knitting the fabric of
distressed neighborhoods,96 they have evolved into crucial and capable
providers of housing and other services, and are significant actors in
widely varied aspects of community development. Few have managed to
become economically self-sufficient, with the result that most depend on
substantial investment of public and private resources. 97 This
dependence is naturally compounded by the CDCs' organizational
interests to be a repeat player in the successive cycles of funding
available from or through state and local development agencies.
Funding for community development in center cities is in limited
supply. As a consequence controllers of the funding have the economic
power to direct community development agendas, a form of top-down
pressure that may distract community-located nonprofits from the
consideration of local neighborhood initiatives.98
The procedures of public programs invite grass-roots input in
theory, but the features of such systems are subject to the critique of
being solely smoke and mirrors. 99 Federal urban policy has required
cities to involve affected residents in development decisions since the
community devastations of Urban Renewal in the 1950s. As a result
traditional local land use planning, development and environmental
management all include participatory mechanisms. 10 0 In practice,
95. See generally Michael H. Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development
Corporationsin Inner City Economic Development, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 753,766-72
(1997) (giving a brief history' and overview of CDCs and community-based economic
development).
96. See id. at 766.
97. See id. at 766-68.

98. See Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development and Social
Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217, 237 (1999) (discussing the tension many CDCs experience
arising from their funding sources, which give them wider political and social legitimacy as players
in urban development, but undermine incentives and opportunities to build grass-roots alliances and
capacities; and put them at risk of narrowing their empowerment objectives to conform to their
investors' interests and views of the political and economic structures that resist social change).
99. See id. at 238. For a discussion of the political advocacy efforts of CDCs, see Quinones,
supra note 14, at 753-58; Norman J. Glickman & Lisa J. Servon, More than Bricks andSticks: Five
Components of Community Development Corporation Capacity, 9 HoUSING POL'Y DEBATE 497,
504-12 (1998).
100. McFarlane, Inclusion, supra note 19, at 868-91 (discussing, inter alia, Housing Act of
1949 § 105(d), Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413, 417 (1949) (requiring citizen participation through
public hearings); Housing Act of 1954 § 221(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 83-560 68 Stat. 590, 600 (1954)
(making citizen participation a mandated element of the "workable program" for community
improvement for those communities or localities that requested provision of mortgage insurance)).
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however, such requirements have tended to "'rubber stamp'... [those]
urban redevelopment decisions that had already been made by the local
government."' 10 1 Stronger participatory requirements arose as part of the
War on Poverty in the 1960s and the creation of the federal Community
Action Program, ("CAP")'0 2 which required "maximum feasible
participation of the poor in the program."' 0 3 Local resident participation
particularly of the urban poor became a significant focus of the
Community Action Program, as "[h]undreds of independent local
organizations (community action agencies) were created to coordinate a
variety of service programs including 'neighborhood services, education,
health, manpower, housing, social services, and economic
development."", 10 4 The direct funding of CAP agencies was not warmly
welcomed by local politicians, and the successor federal urban program,
Model Cities, instead provided for "widespread citizen participation"
intended to minimize the level of neighborhood participation in
comparison to CAP. 10 5 Participation was curtailed by ending direct
funding of community action agencies, and instead "channeling funding
of development through state and local governmental agencies instead of
directly to community groups."' 0 6 When the Community Development
Block Grant ("CDBG") program replaced the Model Cities and other
categorical grant programs in 1974, it sought to redress urban decay by
providing block grant funding to all eligible cities for any of an
extensive list of general activities. 10 7 CDBG replaced "the strong
participatory mandates of the Great Society era with minimal citizen
participation mechanisms."' 1 8 The participatory structures of the more
recent Empowerment Zone program, like those of the Community

101. McFarlane, supra note 100, at 870 (citing Arthur R. Simon, New Yorkers Without a
Voice: A Tragedy of Urban Renewal, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1966, at 54 (providing firsthand
account of the ineffective attempts by poor residents to participate in and impact the outcome of a
New York City urban renewal program)) ("Citizen boards were convened but were often hastily
assembled advisory committees that had a token representative of the communities (mostly poor,
mostly black) on the board.").
102. During the 1960s, the federal government declared a "War on Poverty" and adopted a
number of social service and development programs containing relatively strong participatory
requirements to address the problems of black poverty in northern city ghettos. See generally Edgar
S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964).
103. McFarlane, Inclusion,supra note 19, at 872.
104. Id. at 873 (quoting ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE INNER CITY: A HISTORY OF
NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 91 (1995)).

105. Id.at 874-76.
106. Id.at 876.
107. Id.at 880.
108.

Id.
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Action and Model Cities era, are facially robust. 0 9 To receive
Empowerment Zone designation, a city's application had to contain a
"process by which the affected community is a full partner in the process
of developing and implementing the plan and the extent to which local
institutions and organizations have contributed to the planning process,"
as part of a strategic plan to mobilize and coordinate state, local, private,
and community resources." 0 After the application process ended,
however, federal oversight ceased."'
The eclipse of traditional land use planning procedures by cities'
wholehearted embrace of development agreements and similar bilateral
negotiated approaches leaves next to no room for the public. State
enabling statutes eliminate substantive restrictions that previously
applied to negotiations between cities and developers, in order to
provide exceptional bargaining flexibility." 2 Public participation is
perfunctory and futile: By design it is too little and too late,
disproportionate to the complexity of the undertaking and to the
preferential access of bidding developers. The negotiated processes of
most states utilizing development agreements are not covered by due
process requirements of a public hearing, findings of fact, or prohibitions
on ex parte communications between developer applicants and local
officials. 1 3 As a consequence, current procedures allow officials to
relegate affected community members to after-the-fact comments, the
timing of which precludes meaningful exchange of information between
the public and local government officials. Conversely, the bilateral
negotiation model accords to developers early, active and substantively
significant opportunity for preliminary negotiation within the project
approval process, wherein the developer applicant's input is both critical
and analogous to the
to the local government actors' decision-making,
4
negotiation of private real estate deals. 1
The bilateral negotiation model grants to developers "wide latitude
to prenegotiate the extensive and intricate terms of their agreements
outside of public forums, excluding affected third parties from the
109. Id. at 885.
110. 26 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(2)(B) (2000); McFarlane, Inclusion,supra note 19, at 885-86.
Ill. McFarlane, Inclusion,supra note 19, at 891-92.
112. Camacho, supranote 49, at 39.
113. Id. at 36-37. Public input is a required element of quasi-judicial municipal land use
decisions, and trigger the due process requirements of state and federal constitutions. Thus most
states' zoning laws require a public hearing, as does the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act. This is
also the case for the negotiated processes Planned Unit Developments ("PUDs") and contract
zoning as well as development agreements. Id. at 36-37.
114. Id. at43.
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extensive information exchanges and substantive trading that occur
during negotiations."' 15 It is little wonder, then, that "local officials often
' 16
treat public participation as if it obstructs... the decision process."'
No state statutes or local enabling ordinances allow, much less require,
neighboring property owners or other concerned
residents or community
1 17
organizations to be parties to the agreement. '
Not only do bilateral land deals evade constitutional due process
requirements, but further, no other effective accountability mechanisms
are available to those most impacted by the land use decision." 8 Many
states do not require their development agreements to be consistent with
comprehensive plans or zoning codes. The American Planning
Association's new Model Code takes this position, and allows
development agreements to "address any issue that local land
development regulations can cover," 119 specifically allowing an
agreement to depart from applicable zoning code regulations as long as
it remains consistent with the broad policies of the comprehensive
plan. 120 Excluded third parties, seeking to gain judicial review of the
agreements or the process by which they are negotiated, find that even
lawsuits offer scant relief. Because "[development agreement acts] and
other state laws governing [the] bilateral negotiated approaches afford
substantial discretion to local governments, courts often are unable to
scrutinize the substance of development agreements.''
This depiction underscores the wildly lopsided terrain on which
"public participation" is to take place when local governments engage in
development agreements. The procedures on the books in most states
omit community residents from the processes that fashion the objectives
115. Id.at37.
116. Id. at 38. Hearings, when held, are conducted in some states and under the model code by
a hearing examiner who may not be an official or employee of the local government, and who
collects comments for delivery to the legislative body. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.
§ 13.01(e) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2005) (allowing legislative body to delegate all or part of its
authority to enter into agreements, including holding public hearings, to a possibly unelected
"public principal"); AM. PLAN. ASS'N, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL
STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE § 10-201(3) (3d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter APA MODEL CODE]; see also Daniel R. Mandelker, Model Legislationfor Land Use
Decisions, 35 URB. LAW. 635, 646 (2003) (recommending a single hearing because the "twohearing procedure is wasteful and unnecessary").
117. Camacho, supra note 49, at 39.
118. Id.at35.
119. APA MODEL CODE § 10-504 cmt.; see also id. § 8-701(1) (allowing local governments to
enter into agreements "concerning the development and use of real property"); id. § 8-701(2), (3)
(defining and identifying purposes of development agreements).
120. Id. § 10-503.
121. Camacho, supra note 49, at 44.
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and assess the outcomes of redevelopment projects. These processes are
instead forged by the profoundly asymmetric public/private development
partnerships that predominate today. The bartering nature of the
contemporary development process causes public officials to "'behave
22 Not
like developers rather than guardians of the public interest.""
surprisingly, this profound asymmetry of access to official decisionmakers has produced widespread accounts of corruption and patterns of
favoritism, 23 and enervates the legitimacy of land use decision-making
through negotiated development agreements.
E. Redevelopment Costs and Benefits: Unaccountable Calculation,
InequitableAllocation
The public/private funding of real estate development activity
consists substantially of public transfers to private developers. This
transfer was quite frank under the federal Urban Renewal Program, and
although the modes and transparency of transfer have changed over the
years, transfer of public value from displaced urban dwellers to other
private persons remains a central feature of redevelopment. Today a host
of financing devices is deployed to attract developers to state-favored
projects, including tax exempt development bonds, public finance and
124
City
mixed-public/private finance ventures, as well as condemnation.
centers are remade, and former residents' losses are uncompensated. The
promised benefits beguile, yet the costs to residents and to the public
weal are not benign.
1. The Cautionary Lessons of Urban Renewal
In considering the costs and benefits of redevelopment, we have the
instructive history of Urban Renewal. During the redevelopment of
122. Id.at 49 (quoting Douglas R. Porter, The Relation of Development Agreements to Plans
and Planning, in DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND PROSPECTS 148, 150

(Douglas R. Porter & Lindell L. Marsh eds., 1989)).
123. See Camacho, supra note 49, at 42-43 ("[l]t is not uncommon for developers to attempt to
pay off elected officials in exchange for favorable decisions .. ");see also ALTSHULER ET AL.,
supra note 47, at 59 (discussing the potential for corruption in land use regulation); Denis Binder,
The PotentialApplication of RICO in the NaturalResources/EnvironmentalLaw Context, 63 DENV.
U. L. REV.535, 560 (1986) (noting that "fraud, kickbacks, and corruption are very common in land
development" and therefore make land use regulation a likely area for RICO prosecutions); David
A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1272-74
(1997) (discussing accounts of bribery, favoritism, and developers' influence in local government);
Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence-An
EvolutionaryApproach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 588 (1990).
124. Jodi Wilgoren, Detroit Urban Renewal Without the Renewal: Derelict Houses Razed But
Not Replaced, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2002, § 1, at 10.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:37

southwest Washington, D.C., approved by the Supreme Court in Berman
v. Parker,125 public expenditures in a project in which "private
enterprise... shall be given a preference over any public redevelopment
company" in the transfer of development parcels equaled eighty-seven
percent of the private investment.126 Moreover, the increase in tax
receipts attributable to redevelopment from 1953 through 1973, was less
27
than $5 million.'
Under the land-claiming strategy enacted in the Housing Act of
1949, an interested city first identified "blighted" areas., 28 Under the
Housing Act of 1954, the city was required to present its intended new
use for the site in a "workable program" and submit it for review to the
regional urban renewal office for federal approval. 129 Once approved, the
area could be seized by the agency under the governmental power of
eminent domain. The people and businesses who occupied the land were
compensated and sent packing. The seized land was cleared, and then
sold to developers at bargain prices written down through substantial
130
federal subsidies.

The process was aided by a concept of blight invented specifically
for the purpose of enabling the reconstruction of aging downtowns.
Critics and proponents alike describe the effect, with different
intonation, as applying to buildings that had lost their sparkle and most
importantly, their profit margin.' 3' Urban renewal policy boldly
reallocated privately held land and the public fisc to engineer the postWorld War II retooling of the American city. It was sought by American
business leaders and big-city mayors to respond to the spatial
reorganization of U.S. cities, which mushroomed during the war years,
and to the powerful people and institutions-"downtown merchants,

125.

348 U.S. 26 (1954).

126. See District of Columbia Redevelopment Act § 7(g), Pub. L. No. 79-592, 60 Stat. 790,
796 (1946); Berman, 348 U.S. at 30; see generally Denis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban
Redevelopment and the Loss of Community, 25 IND. L. REV. 685 (1992); Hoeber v. D.C. Redev.
Land Agency, 483 F. Supp. 1356, 1367 (D.D.C. 1980) (under the redevelopment plan over $265

million had been invested by private developers as compared to the less than $230 million invested
by the government).
127. See Hoeber, 483 F. Supp. at 1367 n.37. Even adjusted to 1973 dollars, this is a paltry rate
of return on $230 million.
128. McFarlane, Inclusion, supra note 19, at 869.

129. Id at 870.
130. Id. at 869; Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L.
REV. 203, 215-16 (1978).
131. ROBERT M. FOGELSON, DOWNTOWN: ITS RISE AND FALL, 1880-1950, at 346 (2001)

(providing an extended discussion of the invention of the concept of "blight"); see also Pritchett,
supranote 33, at 16-18.
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banks, large corporations, newspaper publishers, realtors, and other
institutions with substantial business and property interests in the central
part of the city.' ' 132 "Urban renewal agencies in many cities demolished
whole communities inhabited by low income people in order to provide
land for private development of office buildings,133sports arenas, hotels,
trade centers, and high income luxury dwellings."
The result was not decent housing and suitable living environments
for the displaced, or for those in the second great migration from farm to
city continuing after the war. Instead, urban renewal created a massive
of the poor. 134
housing crisis and dramatically worsened the conditions
The legacies of urban renewal are multiple, and for some, cruel: Cities
increased their tax base; developers profited; the financial, real estate
and insurance industries whose fortunes rise on renewed downtowns,
benefited; yet African-American communities were dismantled, and the
economic development that replaced them was largely 35in the hands of
1
white owners of new businesses, clubs, and restaurants.
Three lessons of Urban Renewal apply in assessing contemporary
urban redevelopment. The actual benefits of redevelopment may be
significantly smaller than forecasted. The costs may be greater, and of
36
more kinds, than city leaders commonly acknowledge.' The costs and
the benefits are allocated as if by centripetal force; benefits flow in one
direction, to favored developers constructing islands of affluence
intended for new arrivals,' 37 while the costs are redirected, generically to
132. Marc A. Weiss, The Origins and Legacy of Urban Renewal, in FEDERAL HOUSING
POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 253, 254 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985).

133. Id. at 253.
134. Adam P. Hellegers, Eminent Domain as an Economic Development Tool: A Proposalto
Reform HUD Displacement Policy, 2001 LAw REV. MICH. ST. U.-DETROIT C.L. 901, 939; see also
McFarlane, Inclusion, supranote 19, at 869-70.
135. See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 15-21 (2006)
[hereinafter McFarlane, New Inner City].
136. The critique is raised at local levels that many of these publicly subsidized deals would
have gone forward without the commitment of public resources, or that the projects prove not
lucrative, despite the city's initial projections. See Wilgoren, supra note 124, at 10;Vivien Lou
Chen, The Deal is Offfor Burbank, Mall Developer, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, at Al (reporting
that the city of Burbank invested over $120 million in Burbank Media City Center redevelopment
project but that the project "won't produce a dime in profit for the foreseeable future").
137. See Andrew MacLaran, Master of Space: The PropertyDevelopment Sector, in MAKING
SPACE: PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN PLANNING 7, 42 (Andrew MacLaran ed., 2003)
(discussing the tendency of redevelopment to follow a luxury formula in order to make projects
economically viable and potentially contribute to city property and sales taxes); see also McFarlane,
New Inner City, supra note 135, at 21-25 (arguing that contemporary urban redevelopment's
reliance on concentrating affluence manifests discrimination in its displacement of households who
are planned out, as well as priced out, of the amenities of city living).
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"the public," and particularly to the present occupants of the targeted
city neighborhood.
Displacement's damage to residents in the path of redevelopment
projects may be the same whether by public or by private means, but the
possibilities for remedy differ. Where displacement is compelled by
government through condemnation, some of its effects may be avoided
or lessened through governmental decision making-as to site selection,
notice, public participation, and compensation offers. When
gentrification produces displacement, this is commonly understood as
the operation of a free marketplace, thus identifying an appropriate
governmental intervention is problematic. 38 When PPPs target, take, or
forego taxes and select the redeveloper for tracts of residential terrain,
the impacts on the social community may be as relentless and
ineluctable as they are on the built environment. The process whereby
the city permits large-scale revitalization involving the relocation of
residents and significant demolition of existing properties-predicated
on eminent domain and a reallocation to other uses of the land, indicated
quite literally by tearing down what was, and wiping clean the former
map-requires legal regulation to restore a measure of public serving
reciprocity.
Some redevelopment impact on the city and its residents may be
incremental and absorbable, such as where revitalization turns primarily
on residential rehabilitation that is mainly financed privately by new
homebuyers. 139 In today's urban boom cycle, however, much of the
change in neighborhoods is created not by homesteaders but by private
developers anointed by local government, which assembles land not to
build roads or stadia, but to offer to private developers in a frank bid to
remake space in its preferred, high-end vision. This is no unfettered
market; this is Urban Renewal Reprised.
2.

The Customary Calculus of Benefits
a.

Benefits Anticipated by Local Governments

Since the "back to the city" movement in the 1970s, gentrification
has been welcomed by local governments as a cure for the ills of central
city pockets of poverty. Many cities' economic development strategies
are premised on the rationale that attracting capital investment to low138. Hellegers, supra note 134, at 937 n.248.
139. These can price out previous residents as property values and taxes rise, as evidenced in
the substantial literature on gentrification, and municipal policies to respond to those forces.
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wealth city neighborhoods will mitigate the decline in their industrial
base.140 Local governments believe they have direct economic incentives
for pursuing revitalization strategies that attract middle class and higherearning residents.141 Increased property values may lead to increased
property tax revenues, which local governments sorely need as they bear
growing portions of the burdens of government, from street-sweeping to
homeland security. 142 However, this benefit may not be fully realized, as
where the city adopts a policy to delay reappraisals, 143 or where local
government understaffs its appraisal office as it strives for operational
savings.144 Nonetheless, declining tax delinquencies and tax foreclosures
may be expected in areas undergoing residential renewal, and should
have a positive effect on the city's ability to collect property taxes.
As I discuss in Part IV, these anticipated benefits are enjoyed more
often in the abstract, rather than reliably accounted for as receivables or
140.

See, e.g., MARTIN O'MALLEY, BALTIMORE CITY ECONOMIC GROWTH

STRATEGY:

at http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/
available
(2002),
4
STRENGTH
ON
BUILDING
images/EconGrowthStrategy.pdf (describing the city's need to stem the departure of the African
American middle class); Charles Leroux & Ron Grossman, Putting the 'Chic' Back in Chicago,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 2006, (Magazine), at 10; City of Boston, http://www.cityofboston.gov (last
visited Oct. 19, 2006) (providing businesses the option of viewing descriptions of economic
development initiatives); City of Philadelphia: Neighborhood Transformation Initiative,
http://www.phila.gov/nti/agencies.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (detailing partnerships essential
to revitalize the neighborhoods as the city has done with its downtown); Office of Housing and
Community Development: Developer Incentives, http://www.phila.gov/ohcd/devincents.htm (last
visited Oct. 19, 2006) (offering package incentives for developers); see also THE COUNCIL FOR
INVESTMENT IN THE NEW AMERICAN CITY: A REPORT ON THE CHANGING REALITIES OF CITIES 5-15

(2002), available at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/news/press-releases/documents/mba/full_
report.pdf (highlighting renewal efforts of several cities).
141. See Roberto G. Quercia & George C. Galster, Threshold Effects and the Expected Benefits
of Attracting Middle-income Households to the Central City, 8 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 409, 432
2
(1997), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_080 _quercia.pdf
(discussing the perceived social and economic benefits of middle class presence for cities and
observing that concentration in exclusive neighborhoods is optimal for retail); see generally NEIL
SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REVANCHIST CITY 51-116 (1996)
(discussing gentrification as an amelioration of the loss of affluent residents by many cities in the
1980s); FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 92 (examining the role city governments play in attracting
upper middle class residents).
142. According to a study published by The Brookings Institution, the two biggest sources of
additional revenue raised to replace the drastically diminished federal funds to cities have been the
local property tax (for cities with that taxing power, which are not prevented by voters from raising
the property tax), and the introduction of new fees and increased charges for services such as code
inspections, tree removal, and sidewalk maintenance. See BRUCE A. WALLIN, THE BROOKINGS
INST., BUDGETING FOR BASICS: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF CITY FINANCES 1-6, 14-15, 31-33

(2005). Some cities raised revenue through the sale of city-owned properties. Id. at 34.
143. Frank F. DeGiovanni, An Examination of Selected Consequences of Revitalization in Six
U.S. Cities, 21 URB. STUDIES 245, 251, 253 (1984).
144. See FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 92, at 133-71; REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT:
PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS 269-90 (Mike E. Miles et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004).
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fairly distributed. While the new middle-class migrants may be expected
to pay more to the city in income tax, and owners of high-end housing
may be expected to pay property and recordation taxes, these gains may
be offset by their greater likelihood to itemize and take advantage of tax
deductions and ,credits to reduce- their tax liability. Business
displacement costs are imposed, which may be felt by the city as well as
by business owners, since businesses
that fold or move out of the city are
145
base.
tax
municipal
the
lost to
b.

Revitalization Benefits to Non-displaced Residents

Neighborhood redevelopment on an incremental scale may be
thought to provide significant, if less tangible benefits. By reversing the
physical indicators of decline, it stands to reason that more taxpayers
stay in the city, 146 and more deteriorated properties are brought into
compliance with building code standards of safety and habitability.
Where truly private redevelopment takes place house by house, rather
than on a large scale, that investment may well preserve an existing
housing stock that is architecturally interesting and historically
significant. The local residents as well as the city may generally benefit
from the preservation of a physical link with its past without the direct
expenditure of public funds to achieve that purpose-a benefit which
cannot be delivered by new construction. Landlord-owners of properties
on the intended site of redevelopment may be able to raise the rents
required from tenant-residents of the neighborhood, which in turn makes
the analysis of value to a private individual potentially a matter of public
policy.
The calculus of "improvement" for current residents who do not
relocate is complex and cannot be reduced to a net change in dollar
value of their interests in real property. Whether the improvement of
neighboring parcels that impact resident homeowners by increasing their
properties' market values is indeed a "benefit" to the long-time residents
must be analyzed through that matrix of values that comprise urban
residence. These include not only the economic values of place, but also
the personhood elements of property, the well-being of the affected

145. A 1960 Small Business Administration Report noted that 756 of nearly 3000 firms
displaced by urban renewal went out of business or otherwise disappeared. MARTIN ANDERSON,
THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL, 1949-1962, at 69 (1964).
146. Whether or not this is demonstrably true, it is an articulated belief. See, e.g., J. Peter
Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 How. L.J. 405, 415 (2003) (noting that neighborhood
improvements may provide an incentive for residents to stay).
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individuals, and the social capital/community aspects of the
neighborhood.
Benefits, if they come, do not generally flow to all residents. Poor
residents in the path of urban redevelopment do not share in any
significant ownership opportunities flowing from development of the
place. 147
area. Massive infusions of new capital typically take
Potentially, redevelopment activities bring new private-sector jobs:
paying better than minimum wage, increasing access to additional
consumer credit, enhancing the ability to purchase, to accumulate assets,
and perhaps to save. Redevelopment entails redistribution of the
ownership of private and public real estate, and creates new assets.
Whether the residents in place participate in fact in these collateral
effects of redevelopment depends, not primarily upon location, but upon
the matrix of public policies and local political action to direct their
distribution. Enhancements to this matrix are discussed in Part IV.
3.

Revitalization Costs Imposed on Displaced Residents
a.

Housing Costs

One's housing represents an economic interest-a location in the
shelter market, as well as the locus of a person's important familial,
social and other relationships. The eradication of rental housing that is
affordable to low and moderate income people is arguably the most
significant economic and social cost of neighborhood revitalization.
When the neighborhood converts to ownership property from rental
property, or the neighborhood undergoes gentrification, from low to
moderate income residents to professional and other social elites, the
former tenants must find somewhere else to live. If rents rise throughout
the revitalizing area, or if the redevelopment area requires the relocation
of residents, these residents leave not only the familiar roofs but also
147. Case studies suggest that very high levels of public money are invested, as well as private
capital. See Hoeber v. D.C. Redev. Land Agency, 483 F. Supp. 1356, 1367 (D.D.C. 1980)
(observing that private investment in the redeveloped area of southwest Washington totaled "over
$265 million" and that public expenditures totaled "less than $230 million"). Denis Brion
concludes, as to the redevelopment of southwest D.C., that this nearly-equivalent public expenditure
was a problem of local government's vulnerability to the development industry. Developers were
permitted to control their costs and maximize their profitability by exporting much of the physical
and fiscal work of the redevelopment onto government, which then became unable to recapture the
costs it incurred (for example, by selling prepared development sites at a price that reflected
acquisition and preparation expenses). Some of these costs were recaptured through increased
property tax revenues. See Denis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban Redevelopment and the
Loss of Community, 25 IND. L. REV. 685, 694-98 (1992).
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streets, friends, neighbors, churches, child care arrangements, schools
and transit routes. Poverty in neighborhoods in the centers of the largest
cities remains significant at the same time that the total population of
central cities
has been declining. In several big cities, one in five people
14 8
is poor.
Evidence of the huge loss in number and affordability of units to
working and poor households is a cost imposed with little in-kind benefit
returned to society. During the first decade of Urban Renewal, just onequarter of the thousands of units demolished were replaced'149 -- at much
higher rents and housing wealthier residents. 150 The displacees almost
always incurred higher5 shelter costs and increased cost burdens relative
to their ability to pay.1 1
Citywide impact of displacing redevelopment is hard to assess
because tracking out-moving residents is difficult. Several displacement
studies have reported "consistent negative citywide effects on affordable
housing markets and neighborhood stability."' 52 The third or so of center
city rental units in "poor" or "fair" condition153 may be exacerbated in
gentrifying neighborhoods by landlords who decline to make building
repairs in anticipation of a coming rebuilding boom.
Today, one-third of the nation is unable to afford the cost of rental
housing in the United States. 54 Millions are paying more than thirty
percent of their income for housing, which is the long-standing
benchmark for housing affordability. 55 This includes homeowners as
well as the vast majority of low wage earners and the elderly or disabled

148. See TODD SWANSTROM ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST., PULLING APART: ECONOMIC
SEGREGATION AMONG SUBURBS AND CENTRAL CITIES IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS 1-2
(2004), availableat http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20041018_econsegregation.pdf.
149. SCOTT A. GREER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES: THE DILEMMA OF
DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION 3 (1965) ("At a cost of three billion dollars the Urban Renewal

Agency ...has succeeded in materially reducing the supply of low-cost housing in American
cities."). Of 126,000 homes destroyed between 1950 and 1960, displacing hundreds of thousands of
people at a cost of billions of dollars, just 28,000 were replaced. While over 100,000 of these homes
had been deemed substandard, some 25,000 were not. Id.; see also ANDERSON, supra note 145, at
65.
150. Chester W. Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief 57 VA. L. REV. 745,
791 (1971).
15 1. See Isis Femandez, Note, Let's Stop Cheering and Let's Get Practical: Reaching a
Balanced GentrificationAgenda, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 409,409-10,418 (2005).

152.

Hellegers, supra note 134, at 938.

153. U.S. DEP'T OF COM. & U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY:
1983, CURRENT HOUSING REPORTS, H- 150-83 tbl.A-2 (1985).
154. DANILO PELLETIERE ET AL., NAT'L Low INCOME HOUS. COAL., WHO'S BEARING THE
BURDEN?: SEVERELY UNAFFORDABLE HOUSING 6 (2005).

155.

Id. at2.
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56
who rely on public income benefits. Half of the households with "very
157
As
low income," pay fifty percent of their income for housing.
households
for
heaviest
is
burden
the
increase,
costs
shelter
outmovers'
that lack financial reserves for moving expenses, deposits, and increased
rent. The sheer loss of units affordable to people earning the minimum
wage is staggering. Some 200,000 units are being removed from the
rental market every year, significantly impairing the ability of displaced
tenants to find affordable replacement housing. Between 1993 and 2003,
terms
the number of units renting for $400 or less in inflation-adjusted
158
units.
million
1.2
than
more
of
loss
fell by thirteen percent-a

b.

Dislocation and Loss of Disbanded Communities

Those constituents of the old neighborhood who are involuntarily
displaced may experience significant hardships in economic terms, and
59
in emotional and psychological distress as well. The social costs of
gentrification-caused displacement have been studied for decades, from

156. See generally JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE

HOUSING 2005], available at
NATION'S HOUSING 3 (2005) [hereinafter JCHS, NATION'S
20 0
200
5.pdf; DANILO PELLETIERE ET
5/son
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son
AL., NAT'L Low INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2005 (2005) [hereinafter NLIHC, OUT OF
REACH 2005], availableat http://www.nlihc.org/oor2005.
157. "Very low income" is defined by HUD to mean families (including single persons) whose
incomes do not exceed fifty percent of the median family income for the area. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437a(b)(2) (2000). "Low-income" is defined as families having incomes below eighty percent of
the area median income. Id. Cost burden is the most severe housing problem experienced in the
United States. JCHS, NATION'S HOUSING 2005, supra note 156, at 24-25; see also PELLETIERE ET
AL., supra note 154, at 1. Whereas "affordability" is customarily pegged at thirty percent of
household income, in 2005 "over one in three American households spen[t] more than [thirty]
percent of income on housing." JHCS, NATION'S HOUSING 2005, supra note 157, at 3. In no U.S.
jurisdiction can a fulltime worker earning minimum wage for fifty-two weeks of the year make
enough for thirty percent of earnings to pay the HUD Fair Market Rate for a two-bedroom
apartment. NLIHC, OUT OF REACH 2005, supra note 156. The National Coalition for Low-Income
Housing calculates the "housing wage"--the wage one must earn in order to secure affordable
housing-in 2005 to be three times the minimum wage, or $15.78 an hour. Id.
158. Some 2 million low-cost units were razed or withdrawn from the rental housing inventory
between 1993 and 2003. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA'S RENTAL
at
available
(2006),
NATION
DIVERSE
A
FOR
HOMES
HOUSING:

6
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publicatins/rental/rh -americas-rental -housing.pdf. Since 1996,
rents have climbed more rapidly than the inflation rate, and now stand at an all-time high. Id.; see
also JCHS, NATION'S HOUSING 2005, supranote 157, at 4,22-23.
159. See Marc Fried, Grievingfor a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URBAN
RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359, 359-61 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966). This
occurs in rural as well as urban settings. See, for example, KAI T. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS
PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD 183-203 (1976), which
studies the survivors of the Buffalo Creek mine-related flood in Appalachia.
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the Urban Renewal era 160 to the present.16 1 Gentrification may eliminate

stable poor neighborhoods entirely, depriving the poor of vital support
structures, in the sense of social networks 162 and of personal
psychological ties, related to long-term physical location of one's
home. 63 It is this effect of revitalization projects that underscores the
essential distinction between place and community. "While the
community is both a social and material entity, the neighborhood is a
purely material (spatial) product of the land and housing markets."' 64
c.

Residents' Property Rights Destroyed by Displacement

"Property" under the Fourteenth Amendment is broader than the
technical property under the rules of state law. Residents of redeveloped
neighborhoods are deprived of dozens of legally cognizable rights in
property, which are destroyed along with the homes and streets of the
old neighborhood, as the redevelopment designations proceed and the
investors and wrecking crews line up. Although these are not the
ownership rights featured in land use decisions, to be fair, a reckoning of
the costs transferred onto residents of the targeted terrain must take these

160. See generally Fried, supra note 159; MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: How
TEARING UP CITY NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2004)
[hereinafter FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK]; HAROLD A. MCDOUGALL, BLACK BALTIMORE: A NEW

THEORY OF COMMUNITY 81-83 (1993) (recounting the decimation of the once thriving community

of Harlem Park).
161. See KENNEDY & LEONARD, supra note 40, at 14-24; AUDREY T. MCCOLLUM, THE
TRAUMA OF MOVING: PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES FOR WOMEN 15-24 (1990); James Geoffrey Durham

& Dean E. Sheldon lIl, Mitigating the Effects of PrivateRevitalization on Housingfor the Poor,70
MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1986) (describing the social costs of gentrification-caused displacement and
suggesting limited rent control, tax relief and payments to displaced tenants as mitigating

responses); Peter Marcuse, To Control Gentrification: Anti-displacement Zoning and Planningfor
Stable Residential Districts, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 931, 931 (1985) (describing the
effects of gentrification in New York City, and proposing "anti-displacement zoning" as a solution).

162.

See William Michelson, Residential Mobility and Urban Policy: Some Sociological

Considerations,in RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 79, 83-85 (W.A.V. Clark & Eric G.
Moore eds., 1980).

163.

See Mindy Thompson Fullilove, PsychiatricImplications of Displacement: Contributions

from the Psychology of Place, 153 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1516, 1517 (1996) ("[T]he sense of

belonging, which is necessary for psychological well-being, depends on strong, well-developed
relationships with nurturing places . . [D]isturbance in these essential place relationships leads to

psychological disorder."). Cf D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 255, 279-280 (2006) (discussing differences among individuals' psychological attachments to
place, and arguing that for some people, certain components of "the psychology of home" may

move with an individual to a new home).
164. Neil Smith & Michelle LeFaivre, A Class Analysis of Gentrification,in GENTRIFICATION,
DISPLACEMENT, AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION 43, 45 (J. John Palen & Bruce London eds.,
1984) (citation omitted).
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of persons' liberty is a central
rights into account. Indeed, the protection
' 65
"property."'
of
aspect of western theories
Not the least of these interests is the home, the modern idea of
66
which developed symbiotically with the modern concept of privacy.1 A
resident's interest in her home-for privacy, liberty, or security-is the
same whether the home is rented or owned. Tenants of federally
subsidized housing have property rights in their tenancies and are
entitled to due process prior to ejection and effective loss of their
68
homes. 167 The same is true for private-market tenants.' A staggering
and little remarked-on loss of housing affordable to low and very low
income families has attended the HOPE VI program throughout U.S.
cities.' 69 As a formal matter, thousands of tenants displaced by the
demolition of distressed public housing were given Section 8 vouchers
requiring them to seek a physically qualified and fiscally affordable
70
apartment in the private rental market. Yet the market is so tight in
many cities that many vouchers cannot be applied within their period of
validity.
Contracts form the basis for property rights for many residents in
poor communities. One example is government-paid child care. The
contract signed between the government entity and a private day care
7
circumstances.' '
operator can create a property interest under certain
Similarly, contracts between service providers and low-wealth residents
165. See Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1890 n.1 (2005)
(giving examples of liberal theories of property).
166. See Barros, supra note 163, at 269-72 (tracing the historical development of both
concepts); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991 (1982)
(discussing the importance of the home and its relation to privacy, personhood and autonomy).
167. Davis v. Mansfield Metro. Hous. Auth., 751 F.2d 180, 184-85 (6th Cir. 1984); Jeffries v.
Ga. Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 925, 927 (11th Cir. 1982); Swann v. Gastonia Hous.
Auth., 502 F. Supp. 362, 365 (W.D.N.C. 1980). Moreover, tenants also have a property interest in
subsidized housing payments, if mandated by law. Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1265, 1277-78
(7th Cir. 1981); see also Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214-16 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
section 8 applicants have protected property interests). Further, tenants have a cause of action if rent
ceilings established by the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act are exceeded. Wright v. City of
Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 429 (1987).
168. See Ward v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 786 F.2d 1526, 1530 (11 th Cir. 1986) (declaring that
a tenancy-at-will was a protected property interest).
169. Ngai Pindell, Is There Hope for HOPE VI?: Community Economic Development and
Localism, 35 CoNN. L. REV. 385, 387 (2003) (discussing the history of the HOPE VI program). One
goal of the program was to fund the demolition of 100,000 or more units of distressed public
at 391-94.
housing. See id.
170. Id. at 429-30.
171. See, e.g., Mother Goose Nursery Sch., Inc. v. Sendak, 591 F. Supp. 897, 903-04 (N.D.
Ind. 1984) (finding that a contract between childcare center and state agency can create a "property"
interest).
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of a community-such as medical, social work, or legal services-may
also be recognized as property rights. 172 Residents of low-income
communities are also sometimes holders of professional licenses and
state-issued licenses that grant residents protected property interests in
certain types of businesses. 173 Employment contracts are recognized as
property rights in limited circumstances,' 174 and while they do not typify
the work circumstances of most U.S. workers, they do include unionized
service workers and school teachers.
Pension and insurance payments are additional forms of incomebased wealth and constitute property in low-income communities.
Because these payments are largely private and delivered by the quasigovernmental U.S. Postal Service, redevelopers may think that they will
not be disrupted by displacement. The assumption is supported only for
recipients who know where they will relocate in time to avoid disrupted
delivery. The current accounts of Hurricane Katrina, of HOPE VI
displacements, and of urban revitalization "success" stories from cities
around the country serve to remind us that many families, once ejected
from their homes and kin networks, cannot find a roof together. 75

172. See Hixon v. Durbin, 560 F. Supp. 654, 661 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that contract for
counseling services creates property); N. Pa. Legal Servs., Inc. v. County of Lackawanna, 513 F.
Supp. 678, 683 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that contract to permit legal aid group to represent
indigent juveniles creates a "property" right). Compare Uptown People's Cmty. Health Servs. v.
Bd. of Comm'rs, 647 F.2d 727, 734-36 (7th Cir. 1981) (observing that contract with county to
establish clinic did not create property right in that particular group as contract did not contain
guarantee of future ownership), with Robinson v. Houston-Galveston Area Council, 566 F. Supp.
370, 376 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (observing that the designation as regional Health Systems Agency under
HHS regulations does create a "property" right).
173. See Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 334 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that a doctor has
constitutionally protected property right to practice medicine); Beauchamp v. Luisa de Abadia, 779
F.2d 773, 775 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that a doctor's license is property); Roy v. City of Augusta,
712 F.2d 1517, 1522 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting that license to operate pool hall is property); Reed v.
Vill. of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that the renewal of a liquor license is
property); Herz v. Degnan, 648 F.2d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that a psychologist's license is
property); Sisk v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 644 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that a
fishing license is property); Bier v. Fleming, 538 F. Supp. 437, 447 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (noting that a
harness race driver's license is property).
174. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (observing that, in the teaching context,
"[a] written contract with an explicit tenure provision" is sufficient to establish a property right).
175.

See FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK, supra note 160, at 216-22. This implicates liberty interests

as well as property. Liberty interests that may also be destroyed or impaired by displacement
include a parent's right to make decisions regarding child-rearing and a right to continued
association with child. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) (disallowing the State to
impede on "the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions"); Wooley v. City of
Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923-24 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a mother has a constitutional
right to continued association with her child, even if she is not the child's primary care giver).
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Rights in social insurance proceeds, such as unemployment, Social
Security disability, retirement and survivors' benefits count among
76 An individual who receives checks
protected "property" interests.'
through the U.S. Postal Service faces disruption and delay as he or she
attempts to line up a forwarding address. Receipt of Medicaid and
Medicare are property rights which, while not destroyed by the
destruction of one's home and neighborhood, may certainly be impaired
by displacement. The spatial element in gaining access to medical
treatment arguably gives weight to a related interest in continued
treatment by particular medical professionals with personal knowledge.
Applicants for food stamps who are qualified based on need have
177
On this measure, 37 million
statutory rights to food stamps.
although fewer enroll. 78 Yet
support
food
for
Americans qualify
stamps can be expected to lose them during a
households relying on food
79
1
period of displacement.

are a
176. Berg v. Shearer, 755 F.2d 1343, 1345 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Unemployment benefits
property interest protected by the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.").
177. Villegas v. Concannon, 742 F. Supp. 1083, 1087 (D. Or. 1990) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 262 (1974); Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985)) (expounding that "[flood
stamps are a... statutory entitlement" and that "entitlement to food stamps constitutes a property
interest"); see also Chu Drua Cha v. Noot, 696 F.2d 594, 607 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that benefits
provided under the Refugee Act of 1980 constitute property). Moreover, to the extent that food
stamp applicants have property interests in the allotments, it is well-settled that the allotments
see
cannot be reduced without advance notice. Foggs v. Block, 722 F.2d 933, 940 (1st Cir. 1983);
also Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 250, 260-61 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that the government cannot
rights
reduce supplementary food program funds). It is also important to note that these property
that
(opining
1998)
Cir.
(7th
1197
1196,
F.3d
138
oftentimes expire. See Shvartsman v. Apfel,
time,
"[t]he Food Stamps program entitles qualified recipients to benefits for a specified period of
of the
known as a 'certification period,"' and that "[b]enefits terminate automatically at the end
certification period"); see also Banks v. Block, 700 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that
"a household has no protectable property interest in the continuous entitlement to food stamps
beyond the expiration of its certification period").
178. Only fifty-six percent of people who are eligible for food stamps nationwide receive
benefits, according to the most recent estimate from the USDA. See KAREN CUNNYNGHAM, U.S.
(2005),
DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION RATES: 2003, at 1, 9 tbl.1

available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/menu/Published/FSP/FILES/Participation/FSPPart
2003.pdf.
179. Food Stamps are administered by local governments and the program's decentralization
can impede continuous receipt, even without the disruption of losing one's home to a redevelopment
of
project. As a practical matter applications must be made in person and require periodic reporting
household membership and income.
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ENTITLED TO PROSPERITY

A.

Why Property?

In the particular context of contests over urban space between lowwealth communities and municipality-encouraged redevelopment poised
to displace them, the conception of property incorrectly super-licenses
the owner-takes-all strand of property-talk and disenfranchises
innumerable recognized property interests held by community residents
as persons and as community members.' 80 This is a curable harm. State
and local governments can enfranchise their citizens by modifying
existing property concepts and by enacting correlative changes in their
rules and practices for urban redevelopment that recognize residents'
legitimate interests as property rights in their home neighborhoods.
1. Property Law as Social Infrastructure: Essential Nexus
Between Citizens' Well-being and Their Liberty
Property rules form a foundational system for society. They help us
structure our interactions as individuals, as family members, as
neighbors, and in markets for goods and services. Thus property rules
constitute a system of coincident individual rights and social relations. ' 8'
As a system of legal rules, property is a creature of society which can be
changed. 182 Despite rhetoric of hallowed and hoary eternal verities
associated with property law, the Anglo-American law of property has
changed significantly over time and indeed continues to be reformulated
as the role of land in wealth changes in human history and as new forms

180.

Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601,

631-32 (1998); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property,83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 280-95 (1998). This
disconnect between rhetoric and conceptual or consequentialist probing, mirrors the disjuncture
between folks on the street and lawyers. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY
LAW 1-2 (2000) (noting that while most people think of property as "things," lawyers define
property as "rights among people").
181. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS
OF OWNERSHIP 18-37 (2000) [hereinafter SINGER, EDGES]; JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 13-15 (2000) [hereinafter SINGER, ENTITLEMENT].

Many other theorists view property not merely as that bundle of rights, but as a social institution,
although they do so differently than Singer. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, CRAFTING PROPERTY
FORMS BY THE BUNDLE 37-39 (U. Mich. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 17, 2002),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=331201 (discussing "Property as
Institutions").
182. The systemic aspects of property reflect the social purposes that under-gird societal
recognition of private property-protect the ability to obtain material security; decentralize power;
and to promote individual autonomy.
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their regulatory regimes devised and
of property are recognized and
83
needs.
revised to suit societal
Property lies at the foundation of American law and society. A
number of thoughtful people believe property is the cornerstone to every
85
other right' 84 or even the mother of liberty.1 Economist Milton
Friedman argued famously that economic freedom, in the form of
8 6 In
private property, is necessary for individual and political freedoms.
the international development context, experts extol the importance of
land-holding in developing countries on the grounds that wide
distribution of land is democratizing and is observed to be an important
predicate to civic engagement, to household wealth-building, and to the
87 The "new
healthy growth of local, state and national economies.
property" of the 1960s shared this refrain. Charles Reich put forward the
must have a basis in property, or bills of rights
view that "[c]ivil liberties
''88
them."
will not preserve
Classifying an interest as a property right has far-flung
consequences in our legal system as well as in urban communities.
Contract rights depend upon mutuality and consent, and thus have effect
only against other parties to an agreement. Property rights are
comparative blockbusters-they operate 89against the rest of the world
with or without affected others' consent.1
183. See generally Symposium, The Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J.LEGAL STUD. 331
(2002); see also Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 202-03
(2000) (arguing for regulating markets in human tissue, rather than avoiding them altogether); Carol
M. Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable
Allowance Schemes to Old-fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
45, 46-47 (1999).
184. Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 332-33
(1996) [hereinafter Rose, Keystone Right] (reviewing literature on the centrality of property).
185. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-74 (1964).
186. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962).
187. Eric A. Kades, Foreword:Property Rights and Economic Development, 45 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 815, 820-21 (2004).
188. Reich, supra note 185, at 771.
189. The importance of categorizing an interest as one in property or one in contract is
illustrated by the purchase and sale of an ambiguous item, such as a mobile home. If this is treated
as the conveyance of goods, then a contract can express the legal rights between the buyer and
seller, and no third parties have rights as a consequence of that contract. Property rules play no role.
Suppose however that the buyer dies shortly after purchase and long before paying in full. The
buyer is survived by his adult son, who lives elsewhere. Whether he can move in, or pay under the
contract, turns now on property rules, not the contract to which the son is a stranger. It is here,
where people are not in contractual relation with one another, that property is key in legal relations.
Property is that system of legal rules that determines most of the lawful interactions people have
with one another regarding assets. Ralph Nader's Mobile Home Project in the 1960s demonstrated a
modem instance of re-categorization through legal reform, from mobile homes as neither a

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35:37

2. Ownership Model's Incoherence for Urban Land Disputes
Recently, the complex characteristics of property have been
referenced in a reductive rhetoric of "ownership" that threatens to
eclipse the long-standing if imperfect metaphor of the bundle of sticks as
a way to depict and analyze the nature of property, especially land.
As signified by the bundle, ownership of land does not so much
indicate title to a physical portion of earth as it does the power to
enforce certain rights in the land. Collectively these rights make up the
bundle-the sum total of rights one can have with respect to a parcel of
land. 190
The bundle metaphor says that the various constituent rights-the sticks
in the bundle--can be disaggregated, with each stick standing for a
conceptually separate property right. The Supreme Court has referenced
the bundle metaphor for more than sixty years.' 9'
The metaphor has holes. Property in land is intensely contextual
and does not exist in the abstract as the "bundle" does. An individual's
interest in land cannot be defined without taking into account the
interests of neighbors. Moreover, one cannot identify all relevant
neighbors within the larger human community or environment.
Environmentalists, for example, increasingly add to the panoply of
interests and interactions in land with respect to water and other
migrating resources, toxins, wildlife, and so forth.' 92 Yet in our cities,
warranted vehicle or product, nor real property, to a hybrid per state laws, following the lengthy
investigation of the need for consumer protection regulation by the Federal Trade Commission.
190. Myrl Duncan, Essay, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-based
Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773, 774 (2002).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278-79 (2002); Steward Mach. Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581 (1937).
192. Myrl Duncan offers this example:
[F]illing (or draining) a wetland might be considered a property interest belonging to the
owner of tract on which it lays-a stick in his bundle. Yet in wiping out the wetland the
owner affects drainage on the rest of his land-his whole bundle of sticks-and may
well affect the drainage of his neighbors' lands, represented by their bundles. He also
harms the public and the larger environment by impairing nature's water filtration
system and destroying wildlife habitat.
Duncan, supra note 190, at 775-76 (citing NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., WETLANDS: CHARACTERISTICS
AND BOUNDARIES 36-41 (1995)). Eric Freyfogle is the keenest advocate among legal scholars of the
perspective that the law should embody and express the idea that the prerogatives of landowners are
secondary to ecological health. The primary object of property and land-use law is to specify duties
to "the land community." See Eric T. Freyfogle, Community and Market in Modern American
PropertyLaw, in LAND, PROPERTY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 382, 382-414 (John F. Richards ed.,

2002) (tracing the mutability of property law in U.S. history); see also Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics,
Community, and PrivateLand, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 631 (1996); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Particularsof
Owning, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 574 (1999). Outside the legal academy, K.A. Dixon recounts important
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particularly in land use regulatory and public financing practices, the
multidimensional and relational understanding of property is practiced in
a one-sided way, where "property means ownership, and ...ownership
means power without obligation."'1 93
The overuse of the property-as-ownership model in discussions of
property obscures a more accurate understanding of property as a system
of social relations in conjunction with the rights of persons. 194 The
powerful effects of constitutive rhetoric on understanding requires
searching attention to the full meaning rather than reductionism of the
language we use in expressing legal relationships.195 A more extensive
account of the social consequences of displacement by redevelopment is
needed, cognizable within familiar property rules. Also needed is a
modification of the legal rules for claim-privilege and remedy in light of
the full social consequences of displacement.
Talking about property through the essential image of unfettered
ownership is misleading. It suggests that in the ordinary case, one person
controls all the rights in a particular parcel. What is worse for lowwealth urban communities is the seemingly endless capacity to identify
new sticks in the bundle qua ownership of land with no conceptual
stopping point. This is exemplified by Justice Scalia's suggestion,
writing for the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
land is a property right "categorical
Council; that the ability to develop
'' 96
time."
over
constant
and
in nature
This picture of the social world on the ground is deceptive because
it obscures the fact that, as Joseph Singer observed, "a legal system that
theoretical and practical work on reclaiming brownfields in ways to convert them into "community
assets" in K.A. Dixon, Reclaiming Brownfields: From Corporate Liability to Community Asset
(Univ. of Mass. Amherst Political Econ. Res. Inst., Working Paper Series No. 10, 2000), available
at http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_
193. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 181, at 6.

1-50/WP I0.pdf.

194. Analogous arguments are made in other legal contexts. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, The
Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why
Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL

STUD. 725, 726 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2045-48 (1996) (discussing a variety of contexts, including environmental law).
195.

James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and

Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 688-92 (1985) (describing the law as "constitutive
rhetoric" because it "operates through speakers located in particular times and places speaking to
actual audiences about real people; its language is continuous with ordinary language; it always
operates by narrative; it is not conceptual in its structure; it is perpetually reaffirmed or rejected in a
social process; and it contains a system of internal translation by which it can reach a range of
hearers").
196. Duncan, supra note 191, at 782 n.22 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992)).
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protects property rights is not the state of nature. ' 97 Property owners do
not live in individualistic, unaccountable isolation. They are
fundamentally in social relation with all others in the society through the
rules of property. These rules include doctrines of trespass and nuisance,
which "delegate to owners the power to call on state officials to prevent
198
others from taking or harming" owners' property.
Property law entwines the often conflicting values of freedom (for
some actors) and security (for affected others). Property doctrine amply
illustrates this inherent dynamic tension. Within servitudes, the owner
secures his freedom only by constraining that of subsequent owners who
were not party to the original agreement. Estates doctrines allow present

owners to control future owners' use of the property. A fee owner's
power to exclude limits a non-owner's freedom to be or go where he
chooses. Though less apparent but no less the law, property doctrine also
protects others' security interests from harm at the hand of property
owners. Public accommodations law limits some owners' freedom to
exclude non-owners so that they will not be excluded from the markets
for goods and services. Estates law tempers "dead hand control" with
several doctrines that protect current owners from their predecessors in
title-in particular the doctrines against waste and against unreasonable
restraints on alienation, and the rule against perpetuities. 199 Servitudes
law protects owners' established interests against the harm of new
owners who wish to disrupt existing restrictions through doctrines that
create reciprocal negative easements or that govern termination. 200
3. The Meaning of the State's Role in Property Rights
The state is the maker of property rights. The state must intervene
and resolve disputes between competing claimants. In the urban
development context, often the dispute is not just a clash of rights, but a
197.

SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 181, at 68.

198. Id.
199. Jane B. Baron, The Expressive Transparency of Property, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 208, 215
(2002) (reviewing SINGER, EDGES; supra note 181; SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 181).

200. Id. Singer underscores the conflicting values of freedom and security inherent in property
case law in Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1283, 1453-66 (1996) (discussing property-as-regulation and propertyas-system). Themes of the conflicts between freedom and security, between powers to exclude and
rights to be included, which characterize his works, are joined and extended in SINGER, EDGES,
supra note 181, and SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 181, by claims that these instantiate

conflicts between self-regarding and other-regarding rules internal to property. See, e.g., SINGER,
ENTITLEMENT, supra note 181, at 167 (arguing that property theory and the historical practice of
property law include principles that "promote the norms of decentralization and distributive justice
within the concept and institution of property itself").
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clash of the same right-the right to private property. The statethrough its courts or its legislatures-has to resolve the clash by
privileging one right over the other.
The roles of courts and legislatures in replenishing the well of
property doctrine is centuries old. Renewing legal doctrine is a familiar
and essential process. For all the constancy of property doctrine, it
embodies a tremendous history of momentous change, particularly in the
recognition of new forms of property. Obvious examples that predate the
twentieth century range from the fundamental transformation of persons
from property to agents-reflected in the change from status of serf and
slave-to contract and the development of the system of estates in land
from the Middle Ages forward. More contemporary illustrations include
the changing character of servitude and covenant regimes to a nation of
homeowner associations wielding substantial legal, aesthetic, and
economic powers over co-residents. 20 1 This change is strikingly at odds
with the "castle" metaphor of private homeownership. Titans of industry
surely recognize the utility of transferable development rights and
transferable pollution rights.20 2 In recent decades, U.S. legal institutions
have joined significant societal disputes over commodification of the
human body and ownership of genetic material.20 3 Where real property
once formed the primary source of wealth, today wealth accumulates as
commercial paper and other forms deemed personal property, where the
rules have shifted altogether away from title to contract and its polestar
of mutual assent.20 4

201.

More than thirty million Americans, or twelve percent of the U.S. population, live in

common interest communities. EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND
THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 12 (1994). See EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY
GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1-3 (1997)

(identifying a constellation of concems about exclusion and the social fabric by the rapid growth of
gated communities); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of PrivateProperty, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,

1183 (1999) (characterizing common interest communities as "perhaps the most significant form of
social reorganization of late twentieth-century America").
202. See Rose, Keystone Right, supra note 185, at 340-48.
203. See Mahoney, supra note 183, at 200-15.
204. The Uniform Commercial Code expressly rejected title theory even for transactions in
goods. See U.C.C. § 2-401 (2004); K.N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15
N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 159, 165-69 (1938).
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Property in Personhoodand Place

1. Property and Place
The legal arguments for greater resident control and benefit in
redevelopment constitute a complex claim-emotional and politicalabout the status of the local in our complex society. It resists the view of
urban spaces as mere commodities. My aging row home is no mere site
for the accumulation of capital-based wealth, whether bought by an
enterprising renovator, a speculating landlord, or taken by eminent
domain for downtown parking or a PUD. It is invested with other
significant centers of value, what the critical geographer Lucy Lippard
calls "multicentered. ' ' 20 5 A "place," like property, is both a material form
and a set of lived relationships, simultaneously material and
representative of those relationships. Places and the people who live in
those places are not fungible despite the efforts of post-industrial
capitalist strategies to treat them as if they are, such as when automakers
shut plants and move "the jobs" to Mexico and cities contrive urban
rebirth out of neighborhood death. 6
Property doctrine is an essential tool in defining places. One of the
functions of property doctrine in land is to establish the baseline for who
is permitted to be in a place and who is not. A jurisdiction is divided into
spatially defined areas commonly called "places." To wit:
[I]f a place is governed by a private property rule, then there is a way
of identifying an individual whose determination is final on the
question of who is and who is not allowed to be in that place.
Sometimes that individual is the owner of the land in question, and
sometimes (as in a landlord-tenant relationship) the owner gives
another person the power to make that determination (indeed to make
it, for the time being, even as against the owner). Either way, it is
characteristic of a private ownership arrangement that some individual
(or some other particular legal person)
has this power to determine
20 7
who is allowed to be on the property.

205.

LucY R. LIPPARD, THE LURE OF THE LOCAL: SENSE OF PLACE IN A MULTICENTERED

SOCIETY passim (1997).

206. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981); see also THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (2005); Fran Ansley, Inclusive Boundaries and Other (Im)PossiblePaths Toward
Community Development in a Global World, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 353 (2001).
207. Jeremy Waldron, Essay, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295,

296 (1991).
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Property rules define the relationships of people to places and of
places to people, on axes of private/public ownership, use/control,
acquisition/disposition, and present/future. We think we know what
20 8
property is and yet no satisfactory succinct definition for it exists.
Indeed, the more social consequences we try to articulate as to the
import of property, the more "property" morphs into proxies for wealth
and the means to well-being-more contiguous with or analogous to
premises of capital accumulation-and thus, more plainly do property
rules figure in understanding urban poverty's relationships to urban
redevelopment, residents' displacement, and the future of equitable
development in U.S. cities.
Property theory is in ferment today, enlivened by renewed scholarly
interest primarily in takings. This welcome attention is not likely to
reach the fundamental concerns of those of us who live in distressed
urban neighborhoods. This is, because of distortions created by the
conventionally narrowing views afforded by a doctrinal analysis that is
insufficiently cognizant of law's operations on the street. Takings issues
posit the dyad of owner versus state; land use questions feature the
legitimate exercise of properly delegated authority; the law framing real
estate transactions addresses contractual parties and financial interests
secured by property. Missing from these renditions are the roles of
highly mobile capital, and the entities who wield it for purposes and
under legal models scantily acknowledged by the laws of property or
land use or finance of urban disinvestment and redevelopment. While
not new phenomena, the pace and scale at which these features of the
legal landscape operate to destroy or remake local urban communities
without regard to the interests of their residents is accelerated by the
dramatic rise in "public/private" real estate partnerships in cities across
the nation.
The laws that govern "place"--that effect or impede communities'
ability to exert control over their economic livelihood, the resources vital
to the community and its continued existence-are intimately connected
with notions of property. Yet our notions of "property" are too small to
render social reality. Institutionalized banking, lending, and redlining
practices are facially neutral. Communities are legally labeled distressed,
hence valueless, through redevelopment acts and government appointed
actors. 20 9 These policies together channel investment capital away from
208. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property,90 CORNELL L. REv. 531,
533 (2005).
209. Even the mortgage money that makes homeownership possible for working Americans is
no longer lent by the local bank, a nationalization aspect of the restructuring "real estate market"
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urban, largely minority communities into higher profit-lower risk
investment opportunities. One of the most dramatic and best documented
consequences has been the creation of white suburbs beginning in the
2 10
1950s that produce racialized geographic separation ("donut cities").
This pattern repeats as a perpetual-motion machine, in which
redevelopment powers invite today's development-industry complex to
benefit from "development opportunities" generated by the
government's exercise of its police powers. Together these forces justify
repeating cycles of destruction, dispossession, and disruption through
redevelopment projects that masquerade as discretionary and rational
decisions by private capital.2 1'
that facilitated the equity stripping of many thousands of homeowners and billions of dollars,
through flipping and predatory lending. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL
BURDEN: INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA (2001), available

at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/report/report/relfiles/usdhud.pdf. For more sources on
predatory lending, see Center for Responsible Lending, Predatory Mortgage Lending Bibliography,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage/briefs/page.jsp?itemlD=28012195 (last visited
Jan. 17, 2007).
210. For a discussion of"donut cities," see generally Jessica Elizabeth Davenport, The Donut
Hole: Re-envisioning the City Center (May 16, 2003) (unpublished M.Arch. thesis, Univ. of
Cincinnati), availableat http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/send-pdf.cgi?acc-num-ucin 1053530776.
211. In the early years of U.S. history, government policy transformed a nation of largely poor
people scraping to get by, with a small class of wealthy aristocrats and merchants, into today's
middle class nation. This legacy of public social investments began in the late 1700s under the
tutelage of John Adam and Benjamin Franklin, during Thomas Jefferson's presidency, through land
laws intended to settle the expanding western territories. Land grants continued well into the 1800s,
and benefited railroads as well as householders and yeoman farmers. The Freedmen's Bureau was
created by Congress in 1865 to distribute land to the penniless and landless freed slaves, for the
purpose of economically enfranchising the millions of new citizens. President Andrew Johnson
highjacked this plan by pardoning Confederate soldiers and giving the land to them instead. The
Federal Housing Administration, created in 1934, provided a path to homeownership for millions of
low to moderate income households through the long-term self-amortizing mortgage, federal
mortgage insurance, and the secondary mortgage market that these policies made possible. J. LARRY
BROWN, ROBERT KUTTNER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BUILDING A REAL "OWNERSHIP SOCIETY" 710 (2005), available at http://www.tcf.org/publications/retirementsecurity/ownershipsociety.pdf
(charting the array of asset policies that have made the uniquely broad middle class of the United
States).
The theory that the efficient market is a matter of neutral, value-free laws is central to
orthodox liberal capitalism. See Joel F. Handler, The "Third Way" or the Old Way?, 48 U. KAN. L.
REv. 765, 796-800 (2000); see also Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship.
Challengingthe NeoliberalAttack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 786 (2003) (observing that
"neoliberalism claims to trim the role of government so that the state functions primarily as a valueneutral facilitator of individual choices"). Nineteenth century "laissez-faire" liberalism, resurgent
today in the guise of neoliberalism, advanced the primacy of "the market" over government
regulation. See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE
BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 15-16 (2002) (favorably presenting this new "liberalism" as a
reassertion of nineteenth century ideas about the primacy of the market and the importance of
property rights). For examples of neoliberal legal arguments, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998); and John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian,
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It is the law of property that effectively eliminates the affected
community from the frame of the problem. Because ownership changes
increasingly through local government incentives or by the exercise of
eminent domain or tax delinquency procedures, the law of property is
invoked to substantiate the owner's nearly absolute right to "use" the
property as the owner chooses. The legal dimensions of the urban
redevelopment conflict, however, are fragmented and comprised of no
one doctrinal category alone. Rather, certain rules of property and land
use regulation are privileged by the ease with which they dovetail with
contracts and elicit deeper questions of justice in the allocation of landed
interests in the urban centers of the United States. Complexity is
compounded by property's functionality in building wealth and
liberating poor people from poverty, and the rules of business, property
transfer, and taxation which license the legal entities that invest highly
mobile private capital in land deals while undoing vital communities.
How should the law respond? A critical gap in the current system
exists where the rules for property and the rules for capital create
opposing force fields. The twin characteristics of property as enduring
societal feature yet evolving in its particular rules compels the
consideration of the possibilities of property law in constructing more
equitable solutions.
Property and Personhood: Ackerman's Citizen or
Molloy's Serf?
Where "home" is in contested city space, it is at once home and a
site of struggle.2 12 In an urban neighborhood, the space of the locality is
2.

Commentary, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511,521-30 (2000) (asserting as a
"well established" principle that neoliberal "free trade" as propounded by the World Trade
Organization promotes nations' general social welfare in the long run, despite harms to "special
interests").
These ideas are examined in the context of residential diversity in PETER H. SCHUCK,
DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 203-60 (2003) (emphasizing

the role that "classism" plays in American residential segregation by race). Professor Schuck
provides a nuanced analysis of the three landmark cases in which judges found an affirmative
obligation on government to increase demographic diversity in housing. He argues that the preferred
tool for achieving greater racial and economic integration is a market-based remedy of vouchers,
rather than the mandated fair shares of New Jersey's Mount Laurel decisions, S. Burlington County
NAACP v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I1), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington County
NAACP v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 1), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); inclusionary zoning as in
Chicago's Gautreaux litigation, Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); or bricks and mortar
programs as ordered in New York's Yonkers case, United States v. Yonkers Board of Education,
837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'g 635 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), and 624 F. Supp. 1276
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
212. See LIPPARD, supra note 206, at 201-14.
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shared, never solely the property of one individual, it is the product of
relations of power, property and control. These ideas are infused by the
rich idea of the sanctity of the home. Radin reminds that "[t]he home is a
21 3
moral nexus between liberty, privacy, and freedom of association."
Liberty comprises the core rationale for legal protection of the home
from government intrusion, at least when melded with the privacy
attached to property. People do not have sufficient liberty unless they
have a realm shielded from the domination and interference of others.
But this does not sufficiently construct the "sanctity of the home"
rationale recognized by courts.214 The "property for personhood" insight
augments the notion that liberty requires some form of sanctuary. The
home is a logical choice; by incorporating the recognition that one's
home is "the scene of one's history and future, one's life and
growth ...The home is affirmatively part of oneself-property for
personhood.
,,215
The personhood theory of property Radin proposed was premised
on some control over resources in a person's external environment, as
necessary to proper self-development. 1 6 Radin noted how such a theory
is often implicit in court opinions and commentaries-although ignored
in legal thought.21 7 For example, applying the analysis in landlord-tenant
doctrine underscores the leasehold as a form of property for personhood
rather than a redistributive device because the tenants' rights recognized
by the revolution in landlord-tenant law of the 1970s are accorded to all
tenants, not just poor ones. Thus title to the property in which the tenant
makes her home is not the source of the tenant's interest. Still, that
interest in residence is entitled to greater protection from the law than
the contract might provide.
Radin's thesis is reminiscent of Bruce Ackerman's argument that
decent housing ought to be recognized as a right "based upon the
tenant's 'dignity as a person,"' not so much based on a "just wants"
theory, but on a recognition of some property rights as expressing
personhood: Private law should no longer allow "some people's fungible
property rights to deprive other people of important opportunities for
personhood. 2 18
213.

Radin, Property,supra note 166, at 991.

214. Id. at 991-92 (discussing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
215. Id. at 992.
216. Id.at957.
217.

Id.

218. Id. at 995-96 (discussing Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf
of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J.

1093 (1971)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss1/5

48

Bezdek: To Attain "The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle": Local-Resident
2006]

LOCAL-RESIDENT EQUITY PARTICIPATION

In Planningfor Serfdom, Robin Malloy argues vigorously that the
widespread redevelopment of disinvested city centers through PPPs
delivering large-scale redevelopment projects functions to destroy the
fundamental political values of classic liberalism. 219 Redevelopment by
government in this way surrenders the polity's capacity to seek
maximization of individual liberty, human dignity, and personal freedom
through free-market capitalism. Malloy argues that these values must be
incorporated for the city to achieve its twin potentials: a physically
desirable habitat and a milieu that catalyzes the creative capacities of the
widest spectrum of its residents.
Yet Malloy's focus on the values of classic liberalism has the
disconcerting effect of obscuring the harms that urban redevelopment
practice imposes on individuals and their communal bonds. The losses
incurred in the cores of our cities are not irrelevant to his project.
Because legal doctrine currently gives little recognition to communities
as bearers of rights or responsibilities,2 2' it tends to ratify the
individual's subordinated and powerless position in society who, in
theory, is endowed with liberty and rights within the United States.
Members of a community facing displacement by public/private
development projects are members of the public, and democratic society
is advanced by protecting the security of individuals in their community
membership on the theory that this membership strengthens individuals'
stakes in society more generally. 222 Community, as an expression and
creation of rights-bearing individuals, is itself a source of value in and
for our political order. In an important sense, the law puts the lie to this
fine theory. It provides vehicles for moneyed communities to acquire
rights and responsibilities by organizing themselves into business
improvement districts, common interest communities, and the like. It
provides no comparable means for less affluent communities to organize
into legally cognizable entities to assert their concerns as propertied
interests.

219. ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, PLANNING FOR SERFDOM: LEGAL ECONOMIC DISCOURSE AND
DOWNTOwN DEVELOPMENT 14 (1991).

220. Id. at 49-50.
221. Frug, supra note 51, at 1062-67.
222. Brion, supra note 126, at 706-09 (arguing that community is a symptom of a political
process, and for that reason alone is of constitutional importance-both derivatively because it is
necessary to the realization of individualist values in classic liberalism, and directly important in the
substance and process of values community can generate within the polity).
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3. Personhood and Community: Local, Collectively
Inhabited Space
"Home"-one's abode, one's home streets and associations-is an
experience of place that is both individualizing and collectivizing. The
very sharing of an urban space by its residents can make it a site of
affirmation of individual and collective identity: these are our streets,
our world.2 23
Thus we can identify two opposing notions of "local" that are
relevant to the conflicting claims to control urban redevelopment. On the
one hand, there is a historically authentic identity of a place, for
example, a formerly industrial working-class neighborhood imbued with
its residents' remembered lives and struggle. This locality is pitted
against a planned or proposed reconstruction of the same urban space
during the present era of deindustrialization to offer a revised story of
"capitalist heroism." This is intended to appeal to footloose capital, in
order to lure it to the locale, along with tourists and new renovating
residents, with the hope of reversing the indicators of deepening
decline.224
The case for resident-controlled redevelopment recognizes local
people's claim for space. It offers a brake on the primacy given by urban
redevelopment to the element of "property" as commodified and
alienable, by countering the heavy hand of government on the scale in
the urban redevelopment calculus. It does this through recognition of the
values and meanings that are acquired by real property through

223. For accounts of community building in the form of such collective identity-making, see
generally ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY
(1990); FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK, supra note 160; PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF
HOPE: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 69-74 (1994) (describing the origin of

the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative in community anti-dumping projects that eventually grew
into resident-controlled comprehensive redevelopment of housing, commercial space and
community facilities); Avis C. Vidal, Reintegrating DisadvantagedCommunities into the Fabricof
Urban Life: The Role of Community Development, 6 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 169, 207, 212-15

(1995), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd 0601_vidal.pdf
Greening?,
Community
is
Good
What
building);
community
(discussing
http://www.communitygarden.org/whatgood.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2007).
For more scholars calling attention to the character of city neighborhood as "a lived
space," see McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place, supra note 93; and IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE
AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).
224. See, e.g., Don Mitchell, The Lure of the Local: Landscape Studies at the End of a
Troubled Century, 25 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 269, 272 (2001) (citing Jeff R. Crump, What
Cannot Be Seen Will Not Be Heard: The Production of Landscape in Moline, Illinois, 6 ECUMENE

295 (1999)).
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community use and the particular struggles of households dealing daily
with the externalities of disinvested areas of U.S. cities." 5
Communities are valuable to people,226 as is well documented 227
in
numerous ethnographic accounts of community preservation, renewal
and loss.

228

This is a popularly resonant understanding. 229 Community in

the sense I mean is community of place, distinct from community of
interest.
Communities are also valuable to their members and to the larger
society as a source of norms that work to sustain trustworthy conduct
when legal sanctions fail or are unavailable-although communities may
also enforce bad norms. Furthermore, community is a special sort of
asset, the value of
which depends on the contributions of each of the
230
individuals in it.

225. Id. at 274.
226. See, e.g., Jack L. Nasar & David A. Julian, The PsychologicalSense of Community in the
Neighborhood, 61 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 178, 181 (1995); see also David M. Chavis & Abraham
Wandersman, Sense of Community in the Urban Environment: A Catalyst for Participationand
Community Development, 18 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 55, 55-61 (1990); Thomas J. Glynn,
Neighborhood and Sense of Community, 14 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 341, 349, 351 (1986)
(discussing the values of length of residency, knowing people by name, and ability to have
community actions such as electing caring officials); Thomas J. Glynn, Psychological Sense of
Community. Measurement and Application, 34 HUM. REL. 789, 790, 793 (1981); David W.
McMillan & David M. Chavis, Sense of Community: Definition and Theory, 14 J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOL. 6 (1986) (measuring neighborhood sense of community); Stephanie Riger & Paul J.
Lavrakas, Community Ties: Patternsof Attachment and Social Interactionin Urban Neighborhoods,
9 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 55, 55-57 (1981). See also AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF
COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA passim (1993);
Oddvar Skjaeveland et al., A MultidimensionalMeasure of Neighboring, 24 AM. J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOL. 413, 422-25 (1996).
227. JACQUELINE LEAVITT & SUSAN SAEGERT, FROM ABANDONMENT TO HOPE: COMMUNITYHOUSEHOLDS IN HARLEM 12-31 (1990); LEAH MAHAN ET AL., HOLDING GROUND: THE REBIRTH OF
DUDLEY STREET (New Day Films 1996).
228. See ERIKSON, supra note 159, at 186-203 (discussing the destruction of the mining
community of Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, by flood); see also FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK, supra
note 161, at 216-22.
229. Robert D. Putnam's BOWLING ALONE (2000), regarded as documenting the decline in
civic engagement, has remarkable appeal. See id. 277-84. There is also a great deal of literature
about urban ennui, and the significance of collective undertakings to redress social ills. See, e.g.,
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE 302-15 (1996); LISBETH B. SCHORR, COMMON
PURPOSE: STRENGTHENING FAMILIES AND NEIGHBORHOODS TO REBUILD AMERICA 304-08 (1997).
230. Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman characterize this aspect of community as a
positive externality that can profoundly affect the outcomes of economic transactions, in Selling
Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 79, 81-82
(2004), where they describe the errors derived from the failure of standard law and economics to
account for and incorporate the importance of community in a pollution control conflict in a small
town faced with a buy-out offer by a coal-fired power plant.
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In its physical aspect, a community provides benefits to persons
that they otherwise could not enjoy alone: Amenities such as schools,
stores, transit, and other public goods or privately provided services are
231 Social
only available because of the sufficient demand in the area.
interactions are another set of important benefits-friendships and
interpersonal networks of all kinds that are possible because of physical
proximity and common experiences of place and connection that endure
over time.232
Denis Brion reminds:
Especially among the poor, the existence of a matrix of mutually
shared values and ... concern and support is a necessary condition, not
just to psychic well-being, but to physical survival itself.... The poor

must often depend on a web of mutual support... with each individual
contributing to the others whatever.., special talents he might have.
[Such] exchanges. . . reinforce [each other], creating a milieu the value
of which far exceeds what the physical reality might suggest. When
is destroyed and its members scattered, it is irretrievably
this milieu
3
lost.

23

Community in this sense is a form of social capital, a non-market
relationship of collective risk-facing. Most of the burgeoning literature
about social capital features the collective dimensions of the concept,
2 34 Social
which seeks to identify the bonds within viable communities.
capital is constituted by the presence of informal networks of people
(family, friends, neighbors) who can collaborate to address shared
problems and gain access to city political power.235 Social capital can
inhere in and be enhanced by urban design that enables residents to meet
and be with a variety of people, discourages crime, and expresses
neighborhood heritage. 36 It is expressed and leveraged as well by the
presence of functioning formal networks of people in interest groups and
community-based organizations.237 To this calculus, some would add
231. Id. at 113. This concept can be viewed as the "joint defrayal of fixed costs in providing
essential amenities." Id. at 116.
232. Id. at 114; see also Edward Glaeser, The Future of Urban Research: Nonmarket
Interactions, 1 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 101, 101-04 (2000), available at

http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/brookingswhartonpapers-on-urbanaffairs/v2000/2000.lglaeser.pdf.
233. Brion, supra note 126, at 702. Personal recollections of such webs of mutual support are
related by Dr. Fullilove in ROOT SHOCK, supra note 160.
234. ELISE M. BRIGHT, REVIVING AMERICA'S FORGOTrEN
INVESTIGATION OF INNER CITY REVITALIZATION EFFORTS 13 (2000).

NEIGHBORHOODS:

AN

235. Id. at 8.
236. Id.
237. ld.
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regular contact with people of other incomes, races, ethnicities, and
education levels.2 38
Individuals gain access to social capital where it is stored in the
community's human relationships. Social capital is that which persons
draw on when they enlist the aid of others to solve problems, seize
opportunities, or accomplish objectives, as well as to cope.239 An
essential underpinning is the norm of generalized reciprocity. One
scholar distinguishes social leverage that helps one get ahead or improve
one's opportunities, as through access to job information or scholarship
recommendation, from social support that may come in myriad formshelp with a flat tire, a ride, a small loan. 240 Briggs suggests that coping
capital is especially important for people who are chronically poor
because it takes the place of services that money otherwise would buy. 24 I
In very poor communities, there may be plenty of coping capital to
help members get by, but insufficient social leverage to help individuals
get ahead. There is wide and longstanding agreement that the social
capital stored in job networks, for example, is enormously important to
job seekers including the urban poor, and furthermore, that it matters in
ways that vary by neighborhood composition, ethnicity, gender, job
types, career stage, and local industry base.242
Thus, we see the intimate connection between community 243 and
the well-being of individual persons. 244 Neighborhood is a necessity for
238. Id.; Xavier de Souza Briggs, Brown Kids in White Suburbs: Housing Mobility and the
Many Faces of Social Capital, 9

HOUSING

POL'Y

DEBATE

177

(1999),

available at

http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_0901_briggs.pdf, Pindell, supra note
169, at 404 (discussing the literature propounding and contesting the benefits of mixed-income
housing). Cf john a. powell, Opportunity-Based Housing, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 188, 190-94 (2003).

239.
240.

Briggs, supra note 238, at 178.
Id.

241.

Id.

242. Id. at 180 (citing Harry J. Holzer, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: What Has the
Evidence Shown?, 28 URB. STUD. 105 (1991)). Interest in this form of social inquiry was spurred by
William J. Wilson's influential work on social isolation of minority poor in high-poverty city
centers. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987). He extended his work by explicitly examining the
impacts of spatial segregation and labor market structures on social capital available to individuals.
See Loic J.D. Wacquant & William Julius Wilson, The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the
Inner City, in THE GHETTO UNDERCLASS: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 25, 25-42 (William
Julius Wilson ed., 1993); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF
THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996).

243. "Community," as used here, refers to those in community development, urban
redevelopment, real estate rhetoric and practices. For a cogent consideration of the implications for
community well-being within the vibrant discourses of communitarianism, see Michele Estrin
Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism:Toward a Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. PITT.
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urban living.245 Urban renewal and gentrification, which clear out the old
residents of stable yet poor neighborhoods, deprive the poor residents of
246
a vital support structure.
C. Property Theory Supports a Remedy Where Recurrent Critiques of
the Inequities in Urban Redevelopment Do Not
This section briefly restates familiar explanations for the underrepresentation of neighborhood influence in redevelopment policy,
arguments for greater social equity in the redevelopment context and for
attributing legal significance to residents' interests in the redevelopment
of the space they occupy.
1. Political Economy of the City: Business Influence on Local
Development Decisions
For the last half century, much political science research has sought
to classify and assess the role of business interests on local development
decision-making. Mid-century, the sources of community power were
debated-were wealthy elites, or structures such as interest groups and
political parties, directing process and policy? In the early 1980s, the
competition of "limited cities" to attract and retain capital investment
reemphasized the dominance of business groups. Since cities are limited
in their ability to control capital and labor for production, they focus on

L. REV. 721 (2005). See generally Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48

DUKE L.J. 75, 75 (1998) (discussing the formation of a "Block Improvement District" to rejuvenate
inner-city residential areas); Richard C. Schragger, The Limits ofLocalism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371,

405-15 (2001) (discussing community mediation, community policing and prosecution, and
restorative justice).
244. Indicators of well-being have received limited direct attention in law thus far. See, e.g.,
Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 23, 1714-21 (arguing for an objective theory of well-being for legal
theory and developing an objective approach to property law). Several methods have been devised
to measure and compare individuals' well-being across nations. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS: THE ROLE OF HUMAN AND

SOCIAL CAPITAL 17-62 (2005). In the United States, thoughtful arguments are offered to protect a
minimal quantum of material goods for the poor. Arguments have been made on the basis of
constitutional claims and social rights, and more recently, distributive justice. See, e.g., Charles L.
Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice ofLivelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103,

1105 (1986) (discussing "the derivation of a constitutional right to a decent material basis for life");
Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J.

1623, 1628 (1988) ("'[M]inimum protections' for the necessities of life.., are preconditions for
civic republican citizenship.").
245. See Peter L. Berger & Richard John Neuhaus, Neighborhood, in TO EMPOWER PEOPLE:
FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 165, 165-76 (Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996); see also PUTNAM,
supra note 229, at 18-26.
246. See Michelson, supra note 162, at 83-85; see also Briggs, supra note 238, at 187.
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land-related development activities, which are more popular than
redistributive policies because development appears to bring additional
revenues to the city and can be argued to pay for themselves.2 47 A more
calculating capital-owning class was contemplated by the growth
machine arguments of the late 1980s, in which "property entrepreneurs"
pressed for development policies that would increase the value of their
investments. On this theory, those who stand to benefit from local,
especially land-based, growth, include financial institutions, realtors,
248
lawyers, and institutions such as universities, foundations, and media.
Local government officials become cogs in the growth machine because
they need campaign contributions from property developers and
speculators; although most presumably accept the ideology of
growth
249
values.
land
in
increases
from
benefit
personally
may
some
and
The dominance within cities' redevelopment practices of economic
and growth-related concerns does not necessarily make local
government officials mere pawns of these interest holders. Theories of
systemic power can recognize that sources of power such as capital and
influence are not equally distributed in free-market economies. Thus,
while some groups hold resources that are particularly desired by
political leaders in localities (resources for campaigns, capital
investments, and jobs for constituents), local government officials have
independent powers and can act independent of purely economic
interests. Citizen input through democratic processes still arguably
matters in the interplay of these interests. In other words, economic
interests may be preeminent but are not the exclusive arbiters of local
development decisions.2 5 °
247.

Laura A. Reese & Raymond A. Rosenfeld, Reconsidering Private Sector Power: Business

Input and Local Development Policy, 37 URB. AFF. REV. 642, 644 (2002) (discussing PAUL E.
PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981)).
248. See JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL

ECONOMY OF PLACE 62, 66-84 (1987) (describing various actors who participate in the "growth
machine").
249. Id. at 62; Harold Wolman & David Spitzley, The Politics of Local Economic
Development, 10 ECON. DEV. Q. 115, 118-19 (1996).

250. Reese & Rosenfeld, supra note 249, at 645 (discussing CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME
POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA, 1946-1988 (1989); Clarence N. Stone, Systemic Power in
Community Decision Making: A Restatement of Stratification Theory, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 978

(1980)). Stone has illustrated four distinct regime types, describing the coalition of local
government officials with other interests, in order to govern, marshal resources, enact and
implement policies. In corporate regimes, government officials join in coalition with the growthmachine interest holders: bankers, realtors, developers, and seek to attract business through
incentives and land-based strategies. Caretaker regimes involve neighborhood groups and citizen
interests and often small local businesses, with the overriding goal of limiting initiatives and thus,
taxes. Progressive regimes require substantial citizen involvement, higher educational levels and
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Equity Arguments from Market-oriented Liberalism

Market-oriented liberal critiques of current redevelopment policies
emphasize many U.S. cities' narrow focus on attracting middle and
upper middle class residents back to city centers, and on competing for
certain employers' relocation with tax and infrastructure giveaways. The
arguments most frequently made are the lack of accountability to
citizens/taxpayers/residents in the exercise of municipal powers, 251 and
that officials deprive the poor of resources in so acting.25 2 Political
economy and urban-populist critiques are also raised, arising from the
long-term policies that have concentrated poverty in center cities and the
disproportionate burden imposed by displacing the poor through the
destruction of housing. 3
b.

Lack of Accountability to Residents

All the important elements of redevelopment projects are made
through opaque decisional processes. The initiation of projects is often
out of sight, negotiations of projects are typically conducted in secret,
and the sheer complexity of public financing nixes the ability of the
public to know either the amount of tax dollars or the opportunity costs
expended by their government. This forecloses the requisite degree of
legitimate critical evaluation by the affected communities of the
government's use of public money. 254

often include local educational institutions in the governing coalition, and support policies that
increase amenities and redistribute the benefits of development. Stone refined this typology to
divide progressive regimes into two types, middle class progressive and lower class opportunity
expansion regimes. Id. at 645-46. See also Clarence N. Stone, Urban Regimes and the Capacity to
Govern: A PoliticalEconomy Approach, 15 J. URB. AFF. 1 (1993).
25 1. See Quinones, supra note 14, at 721.
252. See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supranote 248, at 166-67.
253. While not developed here, we can observe that a strong libertarian position would argue
that all property should be privately held, i.e., "Sell the streets!" See, e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD,
FOR A NEW LIBERTY 201-02 (1973). Rothbard discussed the ultimate libertarian program:
The ultimate libertarian program may be summed up in one phrase: the abolition of the
public sector, the conversion of all operations and services performed by the government
into activities performed voluntarily by the private-enterprise economy.... Abolition of
the public sector means, of course, that all pieces of land, all land areas, including streets
and roads, would be owned privately, by individuals, corporations, cooperatives, or any
other voluntary groupings of individuals and capital.... What we need to do is to
reorient our thinking to consider a world in which all land areas are privately owned.
Id.
254. MALLOY, supra note 219, at 93, 108-15.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss1/5

56

Bezdek: To Attain "The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle": Local-Resident
2006]

LOCAL-RESIDENT EQUITY PARTICIPATION

c.

Economic Power Trumps Democratic Process

Given the relative political powerlessness of impoverished
communities, the absence of government accountability negates the
theoretical ability of the political process to trigger a correction. Urban
redevelopment substitutes political values and imperatives for those of a
genuinely unfettered market in the location decisions for redevelopment.
This tendency could operate to promote people-focused development
rather than merely profit-focused development. Arguably that is the
point of government engaging in public/private development
partnerships; using public revenue and incurring debt to achieve
where the private market is
enhanced general welfare, in circumstances
255
so.
do
to
self-interested
not otherwise
Market-oriented liberalism criticizes this result as a marketdistorting and inequitable means of allocating scarce resources. It
produces inefficient development decisions since developers would
build the project anyway if it made economic sense, although they
2 56
should not be building where that justification is absent. Malloy, and
others, would limit government's role in development to those projects
that are strictly necessary to serve the public good, which the private
market will not produce (dams257or airports, but not hotels, office
buildings, shopping centers, etc.).

The corollary dynamic is the corruption of democratic process by
power and privilege. Local political power is readily abused for personal
gain by a wealthy and favored few, and their access to the
redevelopment trough reinforces the market power of the privileged
participants. On this theory, local governments risk perilous ideological
confusion between city-boosterism and government free market
entrepreneurship. In its most vigorous form, this produces, in effect, a
private-sector driven development process that is deeply subsidized by
the public fisc, channels the work to the well connected, and returns
scant benefit to the public generally, and to those directly in the path of
new projects.
d.

Officials Deprive the Poor of Resources

Redevelopment decision-making that excludes the many and
privileges a few is a denial not merely of procedural rights or
255.
vein).
256.
257.

Id. at 99-115, 134 (citing examples of some at least arguably successful projects in this
Id. at 54, 74, 124.
Id. at 124-25.
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opportunities. It allocates public resources to serve participants in a
process from which the most affected residents are fundamentally
removed and expends resources that can not be shown to return even an
attenuated benefit to the displacees as members of the general public. In
effect it expropriates the property and liberty interests of the displacees
without due process and without compensation.
The theoretical justification of redevelopment policies to stake
otherwise reluctant private capital
obscures the economic
interdependence of the locality's existing owners. The redevelopment,
planned without them, will benefit other well-connected wielders of
capital but not those who have stuck it out in an under-serviced and
declining part of the city, contributing social capital and the stability of
neighbors in place. It is wrong to allocate scarce tax revenues to wellheeled developers on both a process and outcome view of equality. The
258
end results harm the poor.
2. Left Critiques
The essential criticism from the left is that redevelopment serves to
funnel resources from the lowest-income households to those who are
well-off. As theory, it seeks to explain the allocation of the observable
benefits of urban redevelopment to repeat-player developers, real estate
investors and lenders, and to patrons of downtown development, many
of whom live in the surrounding suburbs. In other words, the
combination of "blight" clearance definitions, public money, and
eminent domain align to target low-income communities while others
reap the profits of forced transition. 9
Political-economic analysis seeks the causal connections between
economic structure, urban development, and social injustice. 26 It views
258. Quinones, supra note 14, at 734. Gary Gately, Two Views of Baltimore Compete for
Public Money, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at Al.

259. Distrust of the blight license may take various forms, including: (I) the blight requirement
is irrational, that is, rather than serving a compelling public purpose, it is a convenient charade
invoked to justify redevelopment subsidies that are paid to powerful interests; (2) there may be real
blight in poor neighborhoods, but blight findings are not made to spare residents suffering, and the
unnecessarily extensive clearance both blames and further punishes them. See Quinones, supra note
14, at 731-33.
260. In the United States, attention to economic structures and their differential outcomes for
social groups is often resisted and demeaned on the ground that "socialist" parties around the world
conflate injustice with economic exploitation and justice with economic equality. Yet, the recurring
potent grass-roots forces in popular movements for economic inclusion-justice under law-have
been religious leaders and congregants. See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS:
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-63 (1988); CHARLES MARSH, GOD'S LONG SUMMER: STORIES
OF FAITH AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1997); FREDELLE ZAIMAN SPIEGEL, WOMEN'S WAGES, WOMEN'S
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urban development as a set of essentially "economic processes ... which
criticize capitalist outcomes primarily on the basis of their impacts on
the welfare of relatively deprived groups" of people.26'
The approach can distract from the reality that people's interests are
not defined by their economic position alone. Furthermore, additional
features of people's lives may determine aspects of their economic
position or interact with their economic interests.
Networks of influence, based on ethnicity, lineage, gender, or some
other "traditional" relationship combine with the relations of
production to generate structures of domination regardless of the mode
of property ownership.... [M]ost contemporary political economists
simply inore the question of the noneconomic bases of economic
power.
"Urban populism starts with democracy as its value," yet
encompasses a particular sense of "bringing down plutocratic elites"
from the upper economic class that "'uses its control over wealth to
' 263 Writers in this
manipulate government for its own selfish purposes.'
vice versa." 264
than
rather
power
vein "tend to see wealth arising from
Herbert Gans and other writers in the urban populist tradition
"emphasize the elitism of planners and intellectuals in disregarding the
traditional affiliations and desires of ordinary people," and criticize as
antidemocratic their willingness to impose on others their own desire for
diverse and Bohemian urban streetscapes, thereby diminishing the
important contributions of religion and family to persons' senses of well-

WORTH: POLITICS, RELIGION, AND EQUITY (1994) (discussing poor people's movements, welfare

rights movement, civil fights and freedom rides, women's and GLBT fights movements); WHAT'S
GOD GOT TO Do WITH THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT? (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & J. Dilulio, Jr. eds., 2000);
GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1990); National Conference of
Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy
(1986), reprinted in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 297 (Thomas M.

Gannon ed., 1987).
261. Susan S. Fainstein, Justice, Politics, and the Creation of Urban Space 2 (Ctr. for Urban
Pol'y Res., Working Paper No. 71, 1994).
262. Id. at 8. Yet these forces, as well as ordinary corruption, endure tenaciously within. both
socialist and capitalist societies and seem more dependent on culture and political process than on
an economic system.
263. Id. at 16-17 (quoting TODD SWANSTROM, THE CRISIS OF GROWTH POLITICS: CLEVELAND,
KUCINICH, AND THE CHALLENGE OF URBAN POPULISM (1985)).

264. Id. at 17.
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being and security as well as many parents' desire for low-density
neighborhoods or the ordinary person's drive for homeownership.265
Urbanism's post-structuralist philosophy regards culture rather than
economics as the root of political identity. The urban post-structuralists
seek to map "the ways in which spatial relations represent modes of
domination" of less powerful social groups.2 6 The approach identifies
the "'silences' and exclusions in the practices of planners and

developers," thus uncovering "how urban form functions to manipulate
consciousness. ,,267 Where political economists foresee

the end of

divisive-isms, post-structuralist urban studies celebrate cities for their
diversities. 268 Individuals exist as members of socio-cultural groups from
which they draw their identities, derive key aspects of their welfare, and
deploy strategies of resistance and purposeful action. The political aim
within the post-structuralist tradition is the empowerment of the least
powerful, which may coincide with economic betterment but is by no
269
means limited to it.
Equity claims are made in each of these analytic modes. They align
in one sense, in the view that public policy is inextricably bound up in
constructing the urban arrangement. It is essential that it be recast in
order to cease the inequities in redevelopment's allocations of wealth,
power, privilege and substantive outcome. The disproportionate burden

265. Id. at 18. Fainstein detects forms of "democratic authoritarianism" in Gans and other
urban populist writers. Id. at 19-20 (defending homeowner privileges and seeking to justify
communal exclusionism).
266. Id. at 10.
267. Id.
268. Id.at 11 (noting that post-structuralist urbanism finds its genesis in JANE JACOBS, THE
DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961) and RICHARD SENNETT, THE USES OF
DISORDER: PERSONAL IDENTITY & CITY LIFE (1970)). The post-structuralist view is captured well

by Iris Marion Young. She states:
An alternative to the ideal of community [as a vision of democratic polity is] an ideal of
city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference. As a normative ideal,
city life instantiates social relations of difference without exclusion. Different groups
dwell in the city alongside one another, of necessity interacting in city spaces. If city
politics is to be democratic and not dominated by the point of view of one group, it must
be a politics that takes account of and provides voice for the different groups that dwell
together in the city without forming a community.
YOUNG, supra note 223, at 227.
269. Audrey McFarlane similarly illuminates the interwoven yet independent elements of
participation and African-American empowerment in the political economy of urban
redevelopment, in McFarlane, Inclusion, supra note 19, at 866-85. As a strategy this fits into the
American pluralist framework where interest group politics, including appeals to ethnic identity,
provide a longstanding pattern for political activity in U.S. cities, and where freedom from others'
powers has been the dominant value. Historically, it reflects the experience of black protest
movements in American cities as well as subsequent civil rights movements. Id.
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imposed by displacing the poor through the destruction of housing,
whether resulting from local indifference or hostility to low income
residents and their needs for affordable housing, must be remedied.
The foregoing critiques state claims on society, and on government
charged with the welfare of the entire public, but do not suffice to yield
pragmatic remedies for the inequitable practices and outcomes they
name. The proposal set forth in Part IV proposes relief using the more
satisfactory framing of property law to channel the "new" economic
opportunities of revitalization to long-term residents of those low-wealth
neighborhoods slated for redevelopment, into joint ownership of wealthenhancing assets that are legally secure.

IV.

RESIDENT EQUITY SHARES: PROPERTY FOR
PROSPERITY AND PARTICIPATION

A.

Resident Equity in Redevelopment

Real resident benefit from urban redevelopment requires three
things: (1) recognition of the significant socioeconomic investments of
the residents of poor communities, examined in Part III, which stake
them in their collectively inhabited neighborhood space; (2) expression
of residents' stakes in the form of correlative claims on the public
resources associated with redevelopment; and (3) a pragmatic means for
crediting residents' claims within the relevant time frames of decision
and benefit. Benefits should be harnessed with respect to the land use
planning, public funding and decision-making processes from which the
present legal arrangements effectively exclude residents, through
public/private partnership negotiations and public participation
paradigms that have not kept pace. Residents require equity participation
in the deal that threatens them with displacement.
1. Residents' Stakes
Residents' stakes in public/private redevelopment ought to be
protected as property. Legal security is essential within our system of
rights over the control of resources. The assets discussed here should be
viewed as property in order to protect them from expropriation by public
agencies for transfer to private developers or as part of PPPs for urban
revitalization projects.
Protection of residents' interests by property rules, rather than the
liability rules of contract or tort, is appropriate to afford residents the
necessary sphere of choice not to be dispossessed and disentitled to the
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community that they have staked with such resources as they have
mustered in their shared location. 270 A resource or material opportunity
may be viewed in more specific legal or fiscal terms as an "asset" to the
degree that it possesses asset-like qualities. Is it generative of more
resources? How readily can it be exchanged or converted into money?
Greater liquidity and generative capability confer greater choice and
autonomy on the asset's holder. To the extent the holder can parcel it
out-subdivide its uses spatially or in time (as by renting or coowning)-choice is wider still.271 Resources are more like assets to the

extent they are durable and foster reliance: that is, to the extent they are
secure in a physical or legal sense. Applying these principles to the
contested urban neighborhood, the "social capital" that entwines viable
neighborhoods can be rendered cognizable in these respects by
allocating shares in the targeted redevelopment enterprise.
2. Essential Elements of a Responsive Framework
Recent scholarship has posed some new responses to the inequities
of forced displacement. These approaches separately are insufficient but
each embraces a crucial element of a responsive framework.
a.

Fair Shares

One straightforward approach is to increase the payments made to
displaced homeowners by monetizing the subjective value of property
taken by eminent domain ("homeowner surplus") to deal with the
obvious problem that forced sales at fair market value in severely
disinvested neighborhoods fail to compensate displaced long-term
owners for "the subjective element." While legal determinations of just
compensation almost universally reject paying for the subjective value
attributed by the owner, in some circumstances this seems particularly

270.

In contrast to property rules, which confer upon the holder of a property right the power to

determine whether to transfer the protected asset and at what price, liability rules do not give the
holder injunctive relief, but only the remedy of damages for a nonconsensual transfer, typically at a
price set by a third party such as a court or legislature. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1092 (1972).

271. The feature of divisibility is a creature of the legal system's property law regime. For
discussion of the significance of subdividing within the property regime, see generally Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). See also Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by
Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and
Contemporary American "Ownership Society", 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 76 (2005); Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 788 (2001).
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unjust. Some legal scholars have developed proposals for the award of
supplemental damages to long-term owners according to a legislated
schedule reflecting length of tenure, 272 and programs for self-assessed
valuation.27 3 These analytic developments are important for the subset of
residents in disinvested/development-targeted neighborhoods whom they
reach. Yet they do not reach non-title owners, and thus, provide no
remedy for substantial numbers of persons, households and their
communal interests, which will be destroyed by redevelopment projects
that uproot them.
b.

Governance

A second approach looks to governance principles as a means to
enhance community control over redevelopment decisions in their
backyards. Over a decade ago, Benjamin Quinones proposed resident
representation on the redevelopment agency board.274 Recently, Michael
Heller and Roderick Hills proposed to make land assembly the proper
subject of the consent of the residents whose neighborhoods were in
need of redevelopment, through Land Assembly Districts.2 75 The model
of governance they envision is direct control by referendum. Pursuant to
local legislation, the local government would construct consent to the
land assembly by declaring a proposed Land Assembly District, and
purchase proposal to a referendum of the intended
putting the detailed
276
condemnees.
272. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736 (1973).
273. Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 9951002. Fennell limits her proposal for such landowner protection to instances of public taking for
private transfer where the public use is unclear. Id. at 995.
274. Quinones, supra note 14, at 698 (advocating supermajority resident representation on the
board). For a related discussion of two case studies of "community-sponsored" planning in New
York City, see Amy Widman, Replacing Politics with Democracy: A Proposal for Community
Planning in New York City and Beyond, II J.L. & POL'Y 135, 150-73 (2002) (proposing legislative
change to equalize the necessary resources and negotiating power among communities and
encourage inclusive processes).
275. Michael A. Heller & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Art of Land Assembly 3 (Jan. 28, 2004)
(unpublished draft), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/workshop-papers/
Heller.pdf.
276. Id. at 2. While this process could be imposed upon the residents who may not have sought
this particular redevelopment, the collective decision-making is similar to that within condominium
associations, and labor unions. Heller & Hills are not entirely clear as to whether they would limit
the procedure to landowners, homeowners, or "neighbors"; and in the event the Land Assembly
District were rejected, since the rest of the eminent domain process would still be available, they
structure a procedural opportunity that could be very important to communities that avail
themselves of it, but not an absolute bar to redevelopment. Id. at 2-3.
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Collective Action

An alternative approach seeks to reconnect disinvested
communities to thriving realty markets, by addressing the interrelated
problems of land assembly and cost posed to development-seeking cities
by fragmented and diversely held titles. Collective action and
community consent might be fostered through voluntary land assembly,
particularly if practiced by communities as a strategy to coordinate with,
and benefit from, market-based redevelopment that threatens to overtake
severely deteriorated, underinvested neighborhoods.2 77
Separately these approaches are important advances for
instantiating the equities of long-time residents of the islands of
disinvestment in our comeback cities. Still, each is insufficient to protect
community residents' interests delineated in Part II from destruction by
public/private redevelopment projects. Community members ought not
lose their substantial investments in their place, nor have their residency
terminated by local government land use practices that transfer public
resources into largely private redevelopment of residences for others,
until they have approved the redevelopment, or agreed to exchange their
community residency interests for an equity stake in the benefits
generated by the new development. Such an equity stake could take the
form of an alienable right to comparable replacement housing in the new
development, or to shares in the increased economic value justifying the
public participation in the project and generated by it over time, or both.
This set of property interests can be effectuated through reforms of
the redevelopment planning requirements of state enabling statutes, so as
to invest residents with rights to consent to development beforehand, and
to a share in the benefits of the deal in which the locality partnered.
B.

Community Shareholding:Reverse Homesteading

Establishment of the residency values discussed here could take one
or more forms. Most important is the issuance of shares, attributable to
the land area targeted for development, or in the value-generating project
itself, or both. Secondly, creation of a separate Community Equity
Corporation, funded comparably to an employee stock ownership plan,
in which affected community residents would own shares and be capable
277. James J. Kelly, Jr., "We Shall Not Be Moved": Urban Communities, Eminent Domain and
the Socioeconomics of Just Compensation, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REv 923 (2006). For the community

use of nuisance abatement provisions in local building codes, see James J. Kelly, Jr., Refreshing the
Heart of the City: Vacant Building Receivership as a Tool for Neighborhood Revitalization and
Community Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 210 (2004).
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of independent action. A third albeit much narrower expression of the
resident benefit principle that might advance independent of the
shareholding and self-governance principles could be the establishment
of a constructive trust on the PPP's gains from the project in lieu of
beneficial ownership of shares in the profit-making entity.
Direct shareholding reflects community residents' steadfastness in
their home space. In effect this is homesteading in reverse. Under the
Homestead Acts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the federal
government sought to jumpstart the productive use of raw land; in the
contemporary urban context, the government seeks the surrender of
urban land from its occupants.
1. Proposed: Homestead Stakes and Community Equity Shares
The elements of fair share, governance and collective action can be
unified and reinvigorated in the form of two new reifications of
residents' interests: the Community Homestead Stake, and the
Community Equity Share. Shares could be held either in an autonomous
Community Equity Company ("CEC"), or in the project development
entity itself.
At the core of the CEC would be the Community Homestead Stake,
created by reforms to existing statutory structures. The Homestead Stake
would give its owner specific rights to participate in the development
decision-making, most importantly, to vote on the constitutive question
of the proposed redevelopment plan. State and local redevelopment
statutes would require the redevelopment agency to submit proposed
redevelopment for vote by the affected Community Homestead
Stakeholders--effectively conducting a localized referendum on
redevelopment proposals, initiated either by the government agency or
the subject of an application by private developers. The legal right to
vote on the question would likely enhance opportunities for the
community to bargain with the public/private development partners for
particular community benefits. Efforts to forge agreements between
affected residents and developers or public development agencies have
been undertaken from Seattle to New York in order to mitigate the
harmful effects of aggressive developments and secure specific
concessions. 278 However, many communities are unable to muster in
278.

See Sheila Muto, Residents Have Their Say on LAX Expansion Plans, WALL ST. J., Dec.

15, 2004, available at http://www.laane.org/pressroom/stories/lax/lax041215wsj.html (discussing
the community benefit agreement with the Los Angeles airport which provides for environmental
mitigation, noise reduction, and airport related work; negotiations in Seattle between a publicinterest coalition, city officials, and a company planning the downtown development of a
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time to get to the bargaining table. The Homestead Stake would correct
this inequity.
A well-organized community may form a "community equity
company," in which every resident of the targeted development area
would own shares. 279 The CEC would provide a community-controlled
vehicle to create and hold residents' equity shares in the value generated
by the physical and economic redevelopment of their community, and
provide the voting rights that accompany ownership in business entities.
The CEC would reconfigure the "community interest corporation"
demonstration program introduced in the Housing and Urban-Rural
Recovery Act of 1983, modeled on employee stock ownership
to
legislation
corporations, 280 and retooled in the 1992 federal housing 28
1
foster "indigenous community-based financial institutions.",
Under this proposal local jurisdictions would recognize rights of
residents facing redevelopment displacement, in effect permitting them
to exchange their legitimate interests in the community for shares in the
equity and profit from the redevelopment deal that displaces them. This
new right would be created by statute, authorizing the formation of a
CEC, establishing minimum requirements for shares, and identifying the
biotechnology hub over affordable housing, employment, and environmental issues; and the
pressure on Columbia University in New York by neighborhood, business, and civic leaders to
"help create low-income housing in the West Harlem area where [it] has proposed to expand").
Community Benefits Campaigns are currently underway in Denver, Miami, Milwaukee, New
Haven, San Diego, and San Jose. See JULIAN GROSS ET AL., COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS:
MAKING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 5 (2005).

279. The stakes would differ slightly depending on which form of organization is used for the
company. If organized as a corporation, residents would own shares. If the limited liability company
form were used, then residents would be members and own an interest.
280. Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153, 1172 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5318
(2000)) (creating the Neighborhood Development Demonstration, requiring the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development to "provid[e] Federal matching funds... to [local] organizations
on the basis of the monetary support such organizations have received" from neighborhood
sources); see also Harold A. McDougall, Affordable Housingfor the 1990's, 20 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 727, 785-86 (1987).

281. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672,
3859 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5305 (2000)). The aim of the demonstration program was to replicate
the success of community development capital intermediaries such as South Shore Bank in Chicago
and the Center for Community Self Help in Durham, North Carolina, to "improve access to capital
for initiatives which benefit residents and businesses in targeted geographic areas." Id. § 853(b)(2),
106 Stat. 3860. "Community investment corporations" were entities organized either as a depository
institution of a nonprofit organization affiliated with a non-depository lending institution or
revitalize a targeted geographic area,
regulated financial institution, whose primary mission was to.
maintain "accountability to community residents" "through significant representation on its
governing board and otherwise." Id. § 853(b)(3)(D). The board would engage in development
services, and have principals "who possess[ed] significant experience in lending
Id.
and... development .....
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terms of residence that qualify householders within the area targeted for
redevelopment as Community Equity Shareholders. The Community
Equity Shares are conceptually distinct from rights in real property or
condemnation awards that owners of businesses or others in the
neighborhood may have. While this right may be conceptualized as
individual in the way that shares in corporations are personal property,
the essential interest it expresses is the joint interest in determination and
benefit in the collectively inhabited geographic space.
The share would give its owner specific rights to participate in the
development decision-making and in distributions of profits. Its holder
would have the right, with all others holding similar Community Equity
Shares, to participate as a member in the development owner entity, as
one of the class of members holding Community Equity Shares in the
increased value generated as equity shareholders. Redevelopment of the
site would be contingent upon an exchange of equity shares in the
increased values being brought to market. The issuance of such shares
could readily be facilitated by amendment to state and local procurement
statutes that would condition the selection of private developer partners
in PPPs to engage the targeted community residents in this way;
included as a criterion in requests for proposals, development
agreements and regulatory agreements; and incorporated into the legal
documentation of each partnership deal.282
2. Recognizing Capital's Rise and Land's Denouement
The creation of residents' community -stakes in the realty through
the vehicle of corporate shares is not as odd or awkward as it may seem
on first blush. For most of U.S. history, land was the ultimate asset and
primary root of wealth. It was durable physically and financially in the
sense that land retained its value, it was legally secured by "property
rules" and by due process, and it could generate wealth. Land in the

282. Many states allow certain public contracts to be awarded based on "best value," a concept
which is evolving beyond traditional concerns for low price and responsible bidders to allow public
contracting agencies to consider additional factors. Dean B. Thomson & Michael J. Kinzer, Best
Value in State Construction Contracting, 19 CONSTRUCTION LAW., Apr. 1999, at 31. States' best

value procurement rules are variously named "innovative procurement," "negotiated procurement,"
"performance-based procurement," and "competitive negotiation." Id. at 32 (quotations and
citations omitted). In fact, some states specifically exclude cost as a consideration in the initial stage
of the process. Id. A procurement rule requiring bidders to "deal local" is in some sense analogous
to the familiar examples of "Buy America" and "Buy In-State" preferences, which many states have
enacted in their design-build procurement laws. See id. (noting that in some jurisdictions locality of
the vendor should be a factor in the best value equation).
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Homesteading Acts era283 was the most highly generative asset, the
source of political power in the early republic, and of self-sufficiency for
households and economic development for communities.2 84 But in
today's economy, corporate capital has eclipsed land as the asset that
confers autonomy, given its characteristics as highly generative,2 85
highly liquid and thus more disposable than real estate. Arguably it is
even more legally secure than land, because business capital is not
generally subject to comparable restrictions on alienability or specific
use, or to eminent domain.
3. Recognizing the Equity in Social Capital
While gaining proponents among scholars and community
development practitioners, "social capital" continues to sit a bit
awkwardly in economic thinking despite its powerful intuitive appeal.
This proposal reifies aspects of the social capital of the community
facing displacement. into a cognizable form of property that can add
value in low-income communities which are disadvantaged in the
public/private redevelopment dance. The assets in social capital have
heretofore been intangibles, comprised of potentially productive
networks like churches, fraternities and sororities, ethnic lending
to
organizations, and sports leagues. "Capital" traditionally has referred,286
materials.
raw
and
roads,
buildings,
like
things
tangible, solid, durable
Researchers are endeavoring to put social capital to work, to
leverage it in communities where it is weak. While social capital is
formed over time, it can be compounded in the short run.2 87 Facilitating
collective action by the community group by constituting them as
owners of a capital asset in the fiscal sense is one means to achieve that
compounding effect.

283. See generally Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862), repealedby Act of
Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2787 (1976).
284. Hockett, supra note 271, at 99-104 (parsing early American land laws, from the Land Act
of 1796 through the Homestead Acts of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for their
wealth-building import).
285. Id. at 140 ("[H]istoric average annual returns on equity cluster around 6.6%-7.2%."
(citing JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RuN 11 (2d ed. 1998))).
286.

See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

169 (10th ed. 1996) (defining

capital as "a stock of accumulated goods" as well as "the value of these accumulated goods").
287. Lisa J. Servon, The Value of Social Capital in Emerging Communities 14 (New Sch.
Univ. Cmty. Dev. Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 2002-005, 2002), available at
http://www.newschool.edu/Milano/cdrc/pubs/wp/wp.2002.05.pdf.
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C. Predicatesin U.S. PropertyLaw and Community
Development Practice
1. Capital "Homesteading"
In retooling the legal regime for urban redevelopment in this way,
we do have predicates to draw upon for transforming association and
participation
into
ownership-spreading
equity-like
democratic
participations. Examples can be found within and outside of real estate
contexts. These include: financial institutions with resident ownership
(community development credit unions), 288 several forms of homeequity cooperative ventures, 8 9 a long history of agricultural
cooperatives, 29 0 producer and consumer cooperatives, 29 employee

ownership in the forms of Employee Stock Ownership Plans
("ESOPs") 292 and worker owned cooperatives, 293 public mechanisms to

288. See, e.g., National Federation of Community Development Credit Unions-About Us,
http://www.natfed.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=256 (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (describing the
history and purpose of Community Development Credit Unions).
289. See 42 U.S.C. § 12773(0 (2000) (defining community land trusts); see generally Duncan
Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a Race and Class
Divided Society, 46 HoW. L.J. 85 (2002) (discussing the limited equity housing co-op as an
alternative form of property and comparing it to the leasing cooperative and community land trust).
290. See Thomas Broden, Note, Co-operatives-A Privileged Restraint of Trade, 23 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 110, 114-19 (1947) (describing the history of agricultural cooperatives).
291.

See JOSEPH G. KNAPP, THE RISE OF AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE: 1620-1920, at

418-30 (1969) (discussing the spread of the cooperative from agriculture into other areas, including
telephone service, mutual insurance, and mutual savings banks).
292. "An ESOP is a kind of employee benefit plan .... In an ESOP, a company sets up a trust
fund, into which it contributes new shares of its own stock or cash to buy existing shares.
Alternatively, the ESOP can borrow money to buy... shares." National Center for Employee
How
an
Employee
Stock
Option
Plan
(ESOP)
Ownership,
Works,
http://www.nceo.org/library/esops.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). The ESOP can make tax
deductible contributions to the plan with which to repay the loan. "Shares in the trust are allocated
to individual employee accounts." Id. Plans specify the employee categories that participate in the
plan, and the formula for the allocations. "In private companies, employees must be able to vote
their allocated shares on major issues, such as closing or relocating [the company]," and the
company can accord voting rights on additional issues (including the board of directors). Id. About
10,000 companies now have employee stock ownership plans, up from 200 in 1974. Crystal
Detamore-Rodman, Branching Out: An Employee Stock Ownership Plan is More than Just a Great
Way to Boost Morale, ENTREPRENEUR, Apr. 1, 2004, at 61.
293. See LOUIS 0. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER:
EXTENDING THE ESOP REVOLUTION 52 (1986); LOUIS 0. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER, HOW TO
TURN EIGHTY MILLION WORKERS INTO CAPITALISTS ON BORROWED MONEY 84 (1967); see also
Hockett, supra note 271, at 102-04; Peter Pitegoff, Child Care Enterprise, Community
Development, and Work, 81 GEO. L.J. 1897, 1897 (1993) (proposing the use of "[c]hild care
enterprise [as] a vehicle for community-based economic development").
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support resident investment,294 and state recognition of the sharedholding aspect of citizens in an exhaustible natural resource.29 5
U.S. policy has been extremely successful in ownership-spreading
with the important and enduring success of the federal home finance
structure developed through the 1930s and 1940s.296 That innovation has
been paralleled in the case of "human capital" spreading through public
provision of primary and secondary education; the land grant acts of the
nineteenth century by which federal land "staked" the perpetual
endowments for state colleges and universities; the G.I. Bill following
World War II that united in one program both loan guarantees and
education as an asset;297and direct and indirect loans, grants, and subsidies
for higher education.
The Community Equity Corporation proposed here fits neatly
within the framework of the general stock ownership corporation
("GSOC") envisioned by Louis Kelso, the inventor of the now widely
used employee stock ownership plan. 98 The Kelsonian GSOC was
devised intentionally as a highly adaptable device to "ownerize" on a

regional or community-based scale, for example to create communitywide ownership of local business. 299 The Community Equity
Corporation, like the GSOC, is premised on connecting the citizenry of a
geographic place to the economic generative opportunities of that place.
In fact, Congress authorized a GSOC in 1978300 at the behest of Senator
294. 42 U.S.C. § 604(h) (2000) (defining individual development accounts); see also Creola
Johnson, Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation. First We Need a Bed and a Car, 2000 WIs. L.
REV. 1221 (discussing theoretical framework of individual development accounts and their
availability, usage, and success).
295. Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend Program pays each qualified resident of the state an
annual dividend from the Alaska Permanent Fund. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.103 (2006).
The Fund, created by the state constitution in 1977, invests one quarter of all revenue the state
receives from the sale or rental of its mineral resources. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15. Since 1982,
when the current version of the program was enacted, the dividends have averaged more than
Dividend,
Fund
The
Permanent
Fund
Corp.,
Permanent
See Alaska
$1000.
http://www.apfc.org/alaska/dividendprgrm.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
296. Hockett, supra note 271, at 104-17.
297. Id. at 143-53.
298.

See JEFF GATES, THE OWNERSHIP SOLUTION: TOWARD A SHARED CAPITALISM FOR THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 20 (1998).
299. Id. at 55-58 (1998). Gates suggests that municipalities that use buy-lease arrangements to
finance large land acquisitions could readily restructure such acquisitions as GSOCs to achieve
broadly diversified individual ownership by community residents. Likewise, metropolitan area
transit authorities that lease commercial space associated with their rail stations could restructure
these dealings as Community Equity Corporations and achieve shared ownership by community
residents. Id. at 76-77.
300. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2762, 2893 (1978) (adding subchapter
U to the Internal Revenue Code); see GATES, supra note 300, at 76.
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Mike Gravel of Alaska for the purpose of enabling Alaska's citizens
to
30 1
acquire a stake in the TransAlaska Pipeline Service Corporation.
2. Public Value Recapture
The concept of public value recapture is to recoup a portion of the
public fisc that is transferred to private interests through the vague and
opaque processes of public/private real estate development partnerships.
As we have seen, in much urban redevelopment, the way is paved
(sometimes literally) by the local government's aid to private developers
through an array of forms including infrastructure inducements,
foregone taxes, deferred taxes,
land clearance and assembly, and the
30 2
domain.
eminent
of
exercise
Community Benefits Agreements ("CBA") are a self-help version
of value recapture theory, effectuated by community coalitions through
direct negotiation of detailed agreements with the developers. The
landmark CBA in Los Angeles secured a local-hire-first agreement,
living wage jobs, and affordable housing commitments from a
development team that included media mogul Rupert Murdoch, but only
after community opposition coalesced over a planned city subsidy of
over $75 million, in the billion dollar project viewed by the city and its
redevelopment agency as essential to the revitalization of downtown Los
Angeles.3 °3
The doctrine of unjust enrichment and its correlative remedy of a
constructive trust offer further doctrinal predicates for the recapture of
public investment in some circumstances. Where there actually has been
wrongdoing in the usual sense, a constructive trust may be imposed on
the property or the increase in its value. Courts of equity create
constructive trusts "whenever title to property is found in one who in

301. GATES, supra note 300, at 75. That GSOC was never implemented, however, because
Alaskan voters agreed to establish the Alaska Permanent Fund instead, which receives oil related
lease payments and mineral royalties, invests them, and pays dividends to each state citizen. Id. at
76.
302. Quinones, supra note 14, at 710. William A. Doebele, The Recovery of "Socially
Created" Land Values in Colombia, LAND LINES (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol'y, Cambridge, Mass.),
July 1998, at 5, available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/publ-detail.asp?id=406 (observing that
Colombia's law provides for determination of the property value before and after specified
municipal actions to modify land use or densities of a parcel; and on that basis, the municipality
may recapture from thirty to fifty percent of the increase in value and designate the revenues for
specific purposes, such as acquisition of land for affordable housing or open space, or for mass
transit).
303.

Lee Romney, Community, Developers Agree on Staples Plan, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2001,

at Al.
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fairness ought not to be allowed to retain it. ' 30 4 While such trusts are
often imposed to capture the fruits gained through disloyalty or other
breaches of trust by an express trustee, they are "also created where no
express trust is involved but property is obtained or retained by other
unconscionable conduct., 30 5 The court merely uses the constructive trust
to treat the defendant "as if he had been an express trustee from the date
of his unlawful holding." 30 6 The purpose of the trust is to avoid unjust
enrichment. An example in the urban redevelopment context that invites
application of this theory is favoritism in the sale of public lands. 30 7 At
least one court recognized a third circumstance in which imposition of a
constructive trust is appropriate, even absent any wrongdoing by the
defendant-where
the plaintiff has a "higher equitable call" on the
30 8
property.
It is possible that some jurisdictions' political culture might not be
as welcoming to Community Shares in ownership of the benefits of
redevelopment projects, but would embrace an entirely public process
instead. Such a jurisdiction could pursue a public-value-recapture
strategy and form a Community Building Trust or real estate investment
trust, in which the public could receive shares and periodic dividends.
3. CDC Practice
Community development corporations have been an important
engine of community-based self-help for thirty years, and numerous
CDCs have managed to scrap their way further into market-based
practices in service of their community stakeholders, in innovative and
effective ways. One particularly notable path is the creation of
enterprises formed with equity interests. Examples include: the New
Community CDC of Newark, New Jersey, which developed a

304. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TRUSTS 287 (5th ed. 1973).

305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Favoritism and bribery in the sale of public lands are discussed in Kris Wernstedt, Terra
Firma or Terra Incognita? Western Land Use, Hazardous Waste, and the Devolution of U.S.

Federal Environmental Programs, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 157, 182 (2000). "[F]ew areas of local
government administration have been skewered by charges of cronyism and corruption as have local
land use decisions." See also David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened
Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1243, 1272-74 & 1272 n.134 (1997) (referencing anecdotal accounts of
developer power, favoritism, and bribery, and analyses of this aspect of the "developer influence"
model).
308. Starleper v. Hamilton, 666 A.2d 867, 871 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
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supermarket; 30 9 the Kansas City CDC that owns a cement block
factory; 310 and finally, child care centers and health care facilities."'
Capital-intensive undertakings by community development corporations
raise important questions of corporate allegiance even for a nonprofit.
Does it engage the CDC in potentially conflicting interests between the
community served by the enterprise, and the management interest in
investment return? Will the CDC move its capital, as have factories,
store owners, and middle class residents who have fled urban
communities in the last several decades? Community-rooted
corporations, formed as nonprofits, are importantly not as nimble as
private companies, and their capital is less mobile, due to CDC corporate
missions and internal governance procedures. In this way they may be
distinguished from private companies, and even from community
lenders and private foundations that are more likely to have the freedom
to realign their program objectives.31 2
D. Resident Equity in Redevelopment Distinguished
from Enhanced Community Participation
A remedy premised on equity participation reconfigures the
ubiquitous yet vague aspects of prior efforts to articulate communities'
rightful roles in the community development field-participation,
empowerment, and stakeholding-into ownership shares. Participation
of residents in land use planning and redevelopment occurs along a
continuum of "weak" to less so. Despite extensive literature and practice
among land use planners to involve the public in planning and zoning,
and the process's invitation for community comment, these checks rarely
309. Schill, supra note 95, at 771-72 (discussing how, in this example, the CDC leases the land
and provides a share of the capital; day-to-day management of the company is by a separate
supermarket corporation, with the CDC providing support services to augment hiring, product
selection and security; and how members of the CDC sit on the board of the store corporation).
310. Id. at 772.
311. Id.; GROSS ETAL., supra note 278, at 60; Pitegoff, supranote 293, at 1918.
312. CDCs are sometimes criticized for being unaccountable to the communities where they
engage in revitalization. Their dependence on a mix of public and foundation contracts, grants, and
loans can lead CDCs to direct unproductive energies to self-preservation, with the potential
consequence that the most grass-roots level of the community development infrastructure becomes
more responsive to funders' views than to their purported community base. Randy Stoecker, The
CDC Model of Urban Redevelopment: A Critique and an Alternative, 19 J. URBAN AFF. 1, 1-4

(1997); cf Rachel G. Bratt, CDCs: Contributions Outweigh Contradictions, a Reply to Randy
Stoecker, 19 J. URBAN AFF. 23, 23-28 (1997). See also Nancy Nye & Norman J. Glickman,
Working Together: Building Capacity for Community Development, 11 HOuSING POL'Y DEBATE
186-87 (2000), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/
163,

hpd 1101_nye.pdf; Shah, supra note 98, at 237.
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accord any real advisory, investigative or decisional roles.313
Empowerment of poor people is a much-articulated objective, from
grass-roots claims through the federal and state Empowerment Zone
programs enacted in the 1990s. 31 4 Its meanings vary greatly in
practice. 315
1. Stakeholding
Stakeholder theory arose in the context of the business corporation;
its inquiry into whether the organization owes a duty of responsibility or
trusteeship to other societal interests beyond shareholders has been taken
up by innumerable foundations that fund community development
activities.31 6 The theory posits that decision makers do owe duties to
several constituencies, because many sectors have a stake in the outcome
of a decision. Stakeholders are defined by their legitimate interest in the
decision to be made (or in the corporation making them) rather than by
the corporation's interest in them.3 17 Nonprofit funders of communitybased development and action agencies value stakeholder theory on the
view that a process that forces the decision-maker to consider all the
stakes produces defensible decisions, and reduces the risk that those
decisions will politically alienate those left out of the process, and arouse
opposition.

313. Camacho, supra note 49, at 5-6; McFarlane, Inclusion, supranote 19, at 868-92.
314. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., BUILDING COMMUNITIES TOGETHER: A
GUIDEBOOK FOR COMMUNITY BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR EMPOWERMENT ZONES AND
ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES 6 (1994). This participatory mandate evidenced three dimensions:
stakeholder theory, participatory theory, and planning theory. Id.
315. Empowerment can be weak and short-lived, unless embodied in institutions. The need for
organizations at the level of the group or community is well-recognized by NGOs in development
and by governments, for their ability to perform critical functions that enhance the well-being of
people, including to maintain group solidarity and negotiate power in the face of threats, and in
managing resources (community gardens) or income-generating activities (markets). Peoples'
organizations can empower their members by providing a means to deal with other communitybased organizations, and can mobilize countervailing power to meet that of large NGOs and the
state.
316. See, e.g., THOMAS E. BACKER ET AL., WHO COMES TO THE TABLE? STAKEHOLDER
INTERACTIONS IN PHILANTHROPY, 9-10 (2004) (proposing that the philanthropic community create
standards of practice for the involvement of stakeholders by grantees, for purposes of improving
grant-making, increasing accountability and transparency, and empowering communities, among
others), availableat http://www.humaninteract.org/images/insp-paper.rft.pdf.
317. Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation:
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 65, 67 (1995); see also Kenneth E.
Goodpaster, Business Ethics and StakeholderAnalysis, I BUS. ETHICS Q. 53, 54 (1991).
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2. Social Cost Accounting and Public Benefit Requirements
One partial remedy to residents' exclusion, responsive to the
critique of government's non-accountability for its redevelopment
calculus, is to legislate new accounting duties. While citizens ought to be
able to get an accounting from their local government of the amount of
public subsidy funneled into public/private redevelopment projects, an
effective remedy is elusive in the circumstances when government fails
to give an account, or renders one that is inadequate.
New, well-crafted accounting requirements could respond in
important part to the critique that local governments are unaccountable
to the polity for their redevelopment decisions, deals, and expenditures.
Accounting models may be tailored to serve the affected community
specifically, or the taxpaying public generally, by compelling local
government to give a prior accounting of the anticipated fiscal and social
costs of proposed redevelopment, as a prerequisite check on the rosy
projections that customarily attend each project's announcement. Posthoc accounting of the public expenditure, and the gains returned, is also
appropriate. The aftermath of Kelo demonstrated just how widespread
citizens' concerns are, in light of sweetheart deals by politicos and
developer darlings. 31 8 No doubt this fear is fanned by a number of
studies showing that convention hotels and sports stadia have promised
great returns, but have not delivered projected revenue and jobs despite
massive public expenditures.3 19
One proposal for equitably allocating the benefits and burdens of
urban redevelopment is to engage in a fuller cost-benefit analysis. This
requires some means to measure community loss. Various means of
social cost accounting exist, the most familiar in the United States being

318. See Hands Off OurHomes, supranote 4, at 21.
319. JOHN B. O'DONNELL, THE ABELL FOUNDATION, BALTIMORE'S CENTER OF
CONTROVERSY (2005), available at www.abell.org/pubsitems/ec hotel_605.pdf (challenging the
need for a publicly financed convention hotel); Heather Harlan, City Says New Hotel Would Payfor
Itself BALT. BuS. J., June 24, 2005, available at http://baltimore.bizjoumals.com/
baltimore/stories/2005/06/27/story4.html (reporting that the president of Baltimore's Development
Corporation "would bring extra revenue to the city, rather than drain the city of funding");
Heywood Sanders, Space Available: The Realities of Convention Centers as Economic
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20050117_
2005),
(Jan.
Strategy
Development
conventioncenters.pdf. One favorite reuse of land taken for redevelopment, the shopping mall, has
turned out to be a shaky investment for several jurisdictions, improperly putting public funds at risk.
See Timothy Egan, Retail Darwinism Puts Old Malls in Jeopardy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. I, 2000, at

A20; Peter T. Kilbom, An Enormous Landmark Joins Graveyard of Malls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2003, at A12; Peter H. King, Dream Unravels; Fresno: Rise and Fall of Urban Mall, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1988, § 1, at 1; Morris Newman, In Rise and Fall of Malls, Weaker Ones Get 'Demalled',
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at Al.
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the environmental impact statement ("EIS").32 ° To date the most
complete effort to operationalize social cost accounting for
redevelopment is Adam Helleger's proposal of an "SIS" or
socioeconomic impact statement which, like an EIS, would be generated
by local government, undertaken with duties of good faith and of
substantial investigation, and published for public review. 32 1 Helleger
proposes that such an accounting entail, at a minimum, two key
property-based qualitative indicators: (1) multipliers to estimate the
percentage of displaced businesses likely to fail or move outside the city;
and (2) a statistical comparison of the city's affordable housing need
with condemnation's effect on the area's affordable housing stock.322 To
recognize the home and communality effects of the redevelopment, he
proposes qualitative accounting as well-arguing that to bring into the
assessment the ways that the proposed displacement will "tear at a city's
social fabric," the method must necessarily seek to register subjective
elements, including length of residence, role of the neighborhood as the
locus of employment for residents, and the social capital indicated by the
323
number of functioning community organizations and institutions.
Evaluating the benefits returned to an impacted community requires
tracking outcomes, publicly available information, and meaningful
assessment. 324 In the last decade there has been an explosion of interest
in geographic information systems ("GIS") technology as an
extraordinarily powerful tool in urban planning. 325 GIS prepares
excellent graphics, most obviously maps relating sets of census
demographic and other data, in a robust medium. Neighborhood
indicators consortia have developed around the nation with the intention
320. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (2000); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: The DangerousJourneyfrom Command to Self-control, 22 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 103,
141-46 (1998); see also SEBASTIAN MOFFATT, INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING AND FULL COST
ACCOUNTING OF HOUSING (1996), available at http://www.sheltair.com/library/Extemalities.pdf
(reviewing various models and efforts to utilize resource-conscious planning techniques in delivery
of housing; reviewing computer programs available to assist in such planning; and including an
extensive bibliography of Canadian and U.S. sources).
321. Hellegers, supra note 134, at 956-57.
322. Id. at 953-54.
323. Id. at 954. Hellegers's list includes: "average length of residence and/or business
operation in the displacement area"; "percentage of area residents who work in the neighborhood";
the number of community organizations and institutions functioning in the neighborhood;
interviews regarding community life with residents and business owners; whether the community
supports a particular industry or retail sector; the dominant racial, ethnic, cultural composition; and
"whether a similar enclave exists elsewhere in the city." Id. at 954-55.
324. See MOFFATT, supra note 322, at 86-89.
325. See Patricia E. Salkin, GIS in an Age of HomelandSecurity: Accessing Public Information
to Ensure a SustainableEnvironment, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 55, 55-56 (2005).
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of putting into communities' hands the basic ability to measure
3 26
outcomes for community-impacting programs. This mapping process
offers communities and their advocates important tools to make visible
to community residents the layers of significance that render community
features as "assets. 327 It has the potential to aid communities to gain
reforms in their housing structures, mainly through targeting absentee
landlords and disinvestment processes.328
However, as with any technology, the public's ability to use it
effectively lags far behind the capacities of the market actors who can
32 9
Concern is rising that
buy and expense the latest data and software.
to this cartographic
access
without
groups
community
and
individuals
to challenge
ability
their
in
capability will be further disadvantaged
and this has prompted a growing public
official or developer reports,
330
literature.
participation GIS

326.

See, e.g., ASS'N FOR CMTY. HEALTH IMPROVEMENT, A COMMUNITY INDICATORS REPORT

2 (2005), available at http://www.communityhlth.org/communityhlth/files/files resource
/CommunitylndicatorsReportl-05.pdf (reporting on the development of community indicators
from a conference with "more than 400 attendees from around the United States, Canada, and the
Alliance,
the
About
Alliance,
Indicators
Neighborhood
Baltimore
world");
http://www.bnia.org/about/index.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
327. JOSH KIRSCHENBAUM & LISA RUSS, POLICY LINK, COMMUNITY MAPPING: USING
GEOGRAPHIC

DATA

FOR

NEIGHBORHOOD

REVITALIZATION

5,

7

(2002),

available at

http://www.policylink.org/pdfs/Mapping.pdf.
328. One successful example of negotiating with large-scale developers to secure community
benefits is the achievement of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice in Los Angeles.
When a four million square foot expansion was proposed for the Staples Center sports arena with
$75 million in public subsidies, the surrounding community groups, churches, tenants and labor
unions secured a package of benefits for the community residents, including a local-hire agreement
and commitments for living wages jobs, hundreds of affordable housing units, and specific
investments in parks and resident parking. Seventy percent of the 5500 permanent jobs at the
development would be union jobs or would pay living wage or better. Local hiring would be
facilitated by a new first-source hiring program set up by the Coalition with seed money from the
development. JUDITH BELL ET AL., POLICY LINK, ADVOCATING FOR EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT 22
(2004), availableat http://www.policylink.org/pdfs/AdvocatingForED.pdf.
329. Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1150 (2003) (discussing the importance of information costs in the property regime).
330.

See MARK MONMONIER, HOW TO LIE WITH MAPS 71-86 (1991) (discussing the use and

manipulations of maps in development planning); Stuart C. Aitken & Suzanne M. Michel, Who
Contrives the "Real" in GIS? Geographic Information, Planning and Critical Theory, 22
CARTOGRAPHY & GEOGRAPHIC INFO. SYS. 17, 17 (1995); Nancy J. Obermeyer, The Hidden GIS
Technocracy, 22 CARTOGRAPHY & GEOGRAPHIC INFO. SYS. 78, 78 (1995); John Pickles,

Representations in an Electronic Age: Geography, GIS, and Democracy, in GROUND TRUTH: THE
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 1, 20 (John Pickles ed., 1995).
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CONCLUSION: THE SUM OF THE MEANINGS OF EQUITY

Resident-benefiting redevelopment through stock ownership and
shared governance is feasible and just. In the forms I suggest here,
resident participation in ownership of the redevelopment would accord
some measure of equity, in the senses in which "equity" is recognized in
the context of housing markets. First, ownership shares would afford
residents in the new territories opened by local government for publicly
assisted high-end redevelopment "equity" in the finance sense, meaning
shares of stock in the corporate entity, which pay the holder a portion of
the company's profits. In addition, where the redevelopment indeed
creates edifices and locales of value, ownership shares held by residents
would give them a share in that value-in short, that "equity"
understood in the context of real estate, as the value held by the owner of
property, over and above indebtedness relating to it.
To recognize long-term residents' extant stakes in their
communities through participatory and profit shares in the
redevelopment that will uproot them honors three bedrock principals in
law that apply to the claims of residents displaced by public/private
redevelopment: Equity as that system of jurisprudence that developed
interstitially with the common law, when legal remedies are inadequate
in the attainment of justice; equity as the justice applied in conformity
with the law, seasoned under principles of ethics and fair play; and, last
but not least, equity as recognition through the State's legal apparatus of
the justice and fairness of a claim.
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